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Abstract 
We evaluate the effect of the 1932 British General Tariff on the output, labour 
productivity and employment growth of British industries. We provide a new 
disaggregated data set that matches industry-level Census of Production data 
with industry-specific tariff rates to accurately isolate treatment and control 
groups and estimate the effect of the General Tariff using difference-in-
difference regressions. We evaluate a two-group comparison, between newly 
and non-newly protected industries, and a three-group comparison, between 
non-newly protected industries and newly protected industries further divided 
into those given a baseline 10 percent tariff rate and those given additional 
tariffs. In the two-group comparison, we identify a tariff effect that is large 
and statistically significant on output and productivity. In the three-group 
comparison, we show that the positive output and productivity effects of the 
tariff arise from the additional tariff protection, over and above the 10 percent 
level. These effects are observed over the periods 1930-35 and 1930-48, 
suggesting both short-run and medium-term effects on output and productivity 
of UK industries protected by the 1932 General tariff.  
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1 Introduction 
In February 1932 the UK imposed the General Tariff. This represented a 10 percent ad valorem tariff 
for British industries, although some industries received additional duties, on the recommendation of the 
Import Duties Advisory Committee (IDAC), while others were exempt or received protection during the 
1920s. To evaluate the impacts of this measure we explore the following questions: were the ‘newly 
protected’ industries covered by the 1932 legislation stimulated by the tariff over the cyclical recovery of 
the 1930s, improving their standing relative to the non-newly protected and already protected industries; 
can we identify short and medium-term effects from the General Tariff? 
One of the first quantitative studies to evaluate this effect is Richardson (1967) who concluded that 
“the tariff had little effect on the growth of newly protected industries between 1930 and 1935.” This 
conclusion was based on Richardson’s evaluation of the effects of protection on output, employment, 
labour productivity and trade in the newly protected industries of 1932 relative to non-newly protected 
industries, comparing the benchmark years 1930 and 1935 using the Censuses of Production data.  Having 
observed that, between 1930 and 1935, the fall in imports in newly protected industries was less than the 
fall in imports of other industries, Richardson argues for a non-tariff explanation for the healthy 
performance of the newly protected industries – recovery in the newly protected sector was thus seen as 
reflecting general economic recovery in the 1930s.   
 A major weakness in Richardson’s analysis is the implicit assumption that the newly protected and 
other industries shared similar initial conditions in 1930.  There is no attempt to compare the economic 
performance of the newly protected and other industries over a longer period that would allow testing of 
this assumption.  The initial conditions in the 1920s will be unimportant only if industries were comparable 
in economic performance and shared similar characteristics.  We know this was not the case.  We apply a 
difference-in-difference approach, using more information about the economic performance of the two 
groups of industries in the pre-protection period as well as additional control variables to account for 
differences in the characteristics of industries over and above their growth profiles.   
 The difference-in-difference approach builds on Kitson and Solomou (1990) who used the data 
contained in the 1924, 1930 and 1935 Censuses of Production to distinguish the inter-period performance 
of the newly protected industries of 1932 relative to other industries, comparing the 1924-30 and 1930-35 
periods.  Thus, the inter-period difference in performance between 1924-30 and 1930-35 is used to identify 
the effects of protection on different industries.  In order to test whether industry growth was stimulated by 
tariffs, Kitson and Solomou (1990) considered the output and productivity growth performance of the 
newly protected industries relative to non-newly protected industries. Output growth in the newly protected 
group of 1932 was stagnant in 1924-30, whilst the non-newly protected sector saw a weighted mean growth 
of 2.7 percent per annum. However, during 1930-35 there was a substantial turnaround as the newly 
protected group grew at 3.8 percent per annum whilst the other industries grew at 2.3 percent per annum. 
Kitson and Solomou (1990, p. 111) reported a number of significance tests suggesting that the improved 
output and productivity performance of the newly-protected sector during the 1930s was statistically 
significant, whilst there was no effect on the non-newly-protected industries. 
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 Broadberry and Crafts (2011) and Crafts (2012) were the first to estimate difference-in-difference 
regressions to evaluate the labour productivity effects of the General Tariff on British industries, 
introducing two innovations: first, the application of the difference-in-difference model adds a formal 
econometric panel data framework1 to the tests undertaken by Kitson and Solomou (1990); second, as noted 
above, the IDAC implemented a system of additional duties, in excess of 10 percent ad valorem, allowing 
us to compare three groups of industries instead of two. Broadberry and Crafts chose to compare early 
protected industries with the newly-protected group further divided into two sub-groups, the baseline group 
of industries given 0-10 percent ad valorem tariff protection in the 1930s and those industries given 
additional duties on the recommendation of the IDAC.2 The Broadberry and Crafts results suggest that, 
whilst the effect of the tariff on productivity growth is estimated to be positive, the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant, negating the results on labour productivity identified by Kitson and Solomou.  
 The current paper evaluates the Broadberry and Crafts results. Two avenues of research are 
pursued: first, we place the Kitson and Solomou results within a difference-in-difference framework using 
the two-group comparison between the newly protected industries and the non-newly protected industries; 
secondly, we make the Kitson and Solomou data set comparable to Broadberry and Crafts by distinguishing 
the additional duties from the baseline 10 percent protected industries. In constructing our data set we 
identified two substantive problems with the Broadberry and Crafts study. First, as noted above, there are 
problems with the implementation of the difference-in-difference method, which mean that the treatment 
and control groups have not been clearly distinguished. Second, a reading of the tariff regulations of the 
period, and the decisions on additional duties, has highlighted a significant number of classification 
differences with Broadberry and Crafts that affect evaluation of the General Tariff. We provide a detailed 
description of a new data set of the tariff protection received by each of the industries in our sample drawing 
upon contemporary tariff information from a variety of sources, including: IDAC (1932a, 1932b), CET 
(1935), NIESR (1943), Hutchinson (1965) and various HMRC reports. We present the detailed tariff 
classification and list of sources in Appendix A of the Supplementary material to this paper as a resource 
for future research. 
 Our paper provides valuable micro-level evidence on the effects of tariffs on UK manufacturing 
industries in the interwar period. We find that manufacturing industries who were protected by the General 
Tariff benefited in the 1930s relative to non-newly protected industries. Our results complement recent 
work by De Bromhead et al. (2017), who find that UK tariffs led to reduced multilateral trade in the 1930s, 
with a shift towards Imperial imports.  
Although our micro-level evidence is focused on partial equilibrium tariff effects for UK 
manufacturing industries and does not provide direct evidence regarding the macroeconomic effects of the 
tariff, our work is related to the broader literature studying the relationship between tariffs and growth from 
                                                          
1 The difference-in-difference model is now part of the standard econometrics toolkit. We provide a brief outline 
of the model in the Supplementary material. 
2 The 0-10 percent group is a hybrid group of newly-protected (treated) and non-protected (control) industries. 
This grouping does not fit well in the difference-in-difference model – this is discussed further below and in the 
Supplementary material. 
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a macroeconomic perspective where diametrically opposing views on the effectiveness of trade policies are 
common—from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint.3 Economic theory is ambiguous about the 
relationship between trade policy and growth. On the one hand, tariffs can harm growth by increasing 
import prices, curtailing competition and preventing the exploitation of comparative advantage. On the 
other hand, temporary tariff protection can potentially benefit infant industries (Williamson, 1990) and 
boost growth by aiding the discovery of dynamic comparative advantages (Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000). 
Similar divergence exists in the conclusions of empirical research. For example, O’Rourke (2000) 
finds a significantly positive correlation between tariffs and growth in the late-19th century for a panel of 
ten countries. Using data for 22 countries over the period 1920-40, Vamvakidis (2002) concludes that, 
controlling for other determinants of economic growth, tariffs provided a positive and statistically 
significant growth effect. Clemens and Williamson (2004) studied the interwar period within the context 
of the “tariff-growth paradox”. They found that in the pre-1914 period, tariffs were positively related to 
economic growth, in contrast to the post-WWII period where much of the evidence points to a negative 
relationship. The interwar period is then viewed as a transition period between the two regimes. Using a 
panel study of 35 countries over the period 1919-38, they find there is no evidence of a statistically 
significant negative relationship. Focusing specifically on the 1930s, they find that the four core 
economies—Britain, France, Germany and the USA—benefited from significant positive tariff effects 
during the cyclical recovery period after 1932. In contrast, using a panel data set of 16 OECD countries, 
Madsen (2009) tests the relationship between trade openness (using tariff rates as a proxy variable) and 
economic growth, reporting a significant negative effect from tariffs on economic growth in the interwar 
period. The differing results suggest the presence of significant heterogeneity across countries and over 
time. We seek to add value to this debate by clarifying the evidence at the national level using micro-level 
data for UK manufacturing industries during the interwar period. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our updated and extended 
industry-level classification of tariff rates in the 1930s. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and 
results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
  
                                                          
3 See Lampe and Sharp (2014) for a survey of the literature on the relationship between trade and growth. 
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2 Industry Tariff Classification 
The General Tariff imposed a 10 percent ad valorem tariff rate for British industries, although some 
industries were exempt (such as some food products and paper) and a number of industries were already 
protected in the 1920s. The legislation also established the Import Duties Advisory Committee (IDAC) 
with the powers of recommending additional duties for industries making a case in the national interest. 
This meant that the average tariff rate gradually moved towards the 20 percent level.4 
The General Tariff set out to protect most industries that were not already protected by earlier 
legislation. These formed the bulk of UK industries, including most textiles, clothing, iron and steel, 
the engineering trades and non-ferrous metals.  Appendix A shows that the early protected sectors were 
mainly covered by the McKenna Duties (1915) and the Safeguarding of Industries Act (1921). Most 
early protected industries were new industries, such as motor, cycle and chemicals, and formed a 
relatively small share of the industrial sector as a whole. However, the early protected industries were 
not all new industries. For example, the Silk Duties (1925) were imposed on silk and artificial silk for 
revenue purposes and a customs duty was imposed on Hydrocarbon oils (1928). 
Leak (1937) shows that by 1934 only 28.1 percent of imports were subject to the 10 percent tariff 
rate; most industries were given additional duties, with the modal duty being 20 percent. Hence, the 
IDAC played a key role in determining UK trade policy in the 1930s. The Committee’s terms of 
reference were to balance national interest with that of the interests of consumers and producers. The 
Committee saw its aim as implementing a “scientific tariff” to achieve this balance. In a study of the 
decision making process of the IDAC, Mitchell (2005) shows that in proposing additional tariffs the 
IDAC considered a range of factors, including the level of import penetration, the level of efficiency in 
the industry, infant industry aspects, anti-dumping responses, employment effects and regional location. 
Importantly for our identification, Mitchell (2005) concludes that business had a limited ability to 
influence the setting of additional tariffs via the IDAC. In part, this was because business lobbies were 
poorly organised and unable to put forward a coherent case before the Committee.5 In addition, Mitchell 
(2005) notes that the IDAC worked to strict guidelines for the eligibility for additional tariffs. If the 
Committee were not convinced the criteria for additional tariffs were met, businesses could do little to 
convince them otherwise, and “the Committee rebuffed persistent claims” (Mitchell, 2005, p. 36). 
Reflecting this, there was no clear relationship between industry concentration and tariff protection 
(Capie, 1983). Industries with the most market power were not necessarily able to attain the highest 
rents associated with additional tariffs.   
Here, we evaluate the broader statistical evidence on the outcomes of these policies on industry 
output, productivity and employment. To do this, we use industry-level data from the 1924, 1930 and 
1935 Censuses of Production, considering growth rates across two time periods (1924-30 and 1930-
                                                          
4 Although non-tariff barriers, such as quotas, were being used fairly extensively by some countries during the 
1930s, this was not a major feature of UK trade policy. The evidence suggests that the use of quotas was most 
extensive in the gold bloc economies (Irwin, 2012). De Bromhead et al. (2017) show that many of the UK Quotas 
impacted on agricultural goods. 
5 Mitchell (2005) notes a handful of exceptions to this, such as the association representing the Iron and Steel 
industry. 
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35).6  We also use the data from the 1948 Census of Production to build a picture of the medium-term 
effects of the General tariff by comparing the 1924-30 and 1930-48 periods. We classify the industries 
into three groups based on the tariff protection they received. The control group of non-newly protected 
industries is not exposed to the General Tariff in either time period. The second and third groups include 
newly protected industries, subject to the treatment – the 1932 General Tariff – in the second time 
period, but not the first. The newly protected industries are divided into: (i) industries protected at the 
10 percent ad valorem rate; and (ii) industries with additional rates of protection in excess of 10 percent. 
To attain accurate estimates of the difference-in-difference coefficients, it is important that industries 
are correctly assigned to the ‘true’ treatment and control groups. Misspecification of these groups will 
create bias in the OLS estimates. 
There are three key refinements to our classification relative to Broadberry and Crafts (2011). 
First, by using all the data from the Censuses of Production, we have increased the number of industries 
in our sample by 19, from 90 in Broadberry and Crafts to 109 in this study. Secondly, Broadberry and 
Crafts have misclassified the tariff rates on a number of industries (including, for example, jute, bottling, 
seed crushing, leather tanning, leather goods, paper, fancy goods and building materials). Finally, the 
0-10 percent classification group used by Broadberry and Crafts needs to be corrected to separate out 
the unprotected industries, which faced zero tariff protection (control), from industries protected at the 
10 percent rate (treatment). The 0-10 percent group in Broadberry and Crafts includes 33 industries (out 
of their 90 industries), one third of which should be classified as non-newly protected, potentially 
creating a significant bias in the identification of treatment and control groups. 
 
3  Empirical Results 
3.1 Two-Group Classification 
We follow Broadberry and Crafts (2011) in using the difference-in-difference methodology to 
evaluate the effects of the General Tariff. We first estimate the impact of the 1932 General Tariff using 
a two-group classification of industries and data for two time periods (1924-30 and 1930-35). This 
represents an extension of the Kitson and Solomou (1990) methodology to a difference-in-difference 
regression framework. All regressions are estimated using OLS, and robust standard errors are reported. 
As explained above, the control group includes the non-newly protected industries, a group which 
includes both industries that were protected early in the 1920s and industries that did not receive 
protection in the interwar period.7 There are no industries in our sample that received protection prior 
to the 1932 General Tariff, but not after. For the two-group classification, the treatment group includes 
newly protected industries, and does not distinguish between industries protected at the 10 percent rate 
                                                          
6 The two time periods (1924-30 and 1930-35) are used because of data availability. The Censuses of Production, 
our source of industry-level data, were carried out in 1924, 1930 and 1935 only. Kitson and Solomou (1990) and 
Broadberry and Crafts (2011) use data for the same two time periods. 
7 At this stage, it should be noted that heterogeneity in our control group (i.e. including unprotected and early 
protected industries) poses a potential problem for the application of the difference-in-difference methodology. In 
Appendix B.5, we explore the sensitivity of our results to this assumption and find that the results are robust in 
this dimension. 
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or those with additional duties. By controlling for differences between the control and treatment groups 
before the policy change, the difference-in-difference regressions directly address the problems with 
Richardson’s (1967) analysis. 
The two-group difference-in-difference model is given by the following equation: 
Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿(𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 × 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁  is an index denoting the 𝑁𝑁  industries in our sample and 𝑡𝑡 = 1,2  is an index 
denoting the two time periods, 1924-30 and 1930-35 respectively. The dependent variable Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
represents the annualised growth rate of real net output, productivity – measured as real net output per 
worker – or employment for industry 𝑖𝑖 during time period 𝑡𝑡. The time-invariant explanatory variable 
𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable set equal to unity if industry 𝑖𝑖 was newly protected, and zero otherwise. 
The industry-invariant explanatory variable 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡  is a time dummy variable set equal to unity for 
observations in the second time period, 1930-35, and zero otherwise.  
Given these definitions, the parameters in the above equation have the following meaning. The 
intercept 𝛼𝛼0  captures the average annual output, productivity or employment growth of non-newly 
protected industries in 1924-30. The time dummy coefficient 𝛼𝛼1 captures the average additional annual 
output, productivity or employment growth for non-newly protected industries in 1930-35 in excess of 
their 1924-30 growth. Therefore, the sum of 𝛼𝛼0  and  𝛼𝛼1  equals the total average annual output, 
productivity or employment growth for non-newly protected industries between 1930 and 1935. 
Similarly, the sum of 𝛼𝛼0 and  𝛽𝛽 is equal to the average annual output, productivity or employment 
growth for newly protected industries in 1924-30, such that 𝛽𝛽 captures the differential growth rates of 
newly and non-newly protected industries over the first time period. 
The difference-in-difference coefficient 𝛿𝛿 is of principal interest, measuring the average increase 
in annual real output, productivity or employment growth from 1924-30 to 1930-35 for the newly 
protected industries conditional on the change in growth for the non-newly protected industries. The 
inclusion of the time dummy 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 controls for time fixed effects – factors that are constant across 
industries, but vary across time, such as the prevailing macroeconomic environment – and the inclusion 
of the industry dummy 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 accounts for industry-group fixed effects – factors that are constant 
over time, but specific to each group of industries, such as pre-tariff initial conditions for industry 
groups. Therefore, the difference-in-difference estimator captures the treatment effect of the tariff on 
newly protected industries: the increase in annual output, productivity or employment growth for newly 
protected industries once the average growth increase of non-newly protected industries over the same 
period has been accounted for. This expression formalises this: 
𝛿𝛿1 = �𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 0��
− �𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 0�� 
where 𝐸𝐸 represents the (conditional) expectations operator. 
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Figures 1 and 2 graphically illustrate the logic underlying the difference-in-difference 
methodology using the tariff classification details in section 2 and Appendix A.8 The plots present 
industry-by-industry annual growth rates of (net) output and labour productivity respectively. In both 
figures, the horizontal axis plots the average annual growth rate of the variable of interest in 1924-30, 
while the vertical axis plots the average annual growth rate in 1930-35. The solid line depicts the 45-
degree ray of constant industry growth rates in the two periods. Observations that lie above the 45-
degree ray indicate that an industry grew faster in 1930-35 period than in the first, and vice-versa for 
observations that lie below. In Figure 1, plotting annual output growth, the proportion of newly 
protected industries (indicated by a red cross) lying above the 45-degree ray clearly exceeds the 
proportion lying below. That is, the number of newly protected industries that experienced faster annual 
output growth between 1930 and 1935 exceeds the number that grew faster between 1924 and 1930. In 
contrast, growth of non-newly protected industries (indicated by a blue circle) is more diverse, with 
many industries both above and below the 45-degree ray. That is, relative to the non-newly protected 
control group, a greater proportion of newly protected treated industries grew faster in the period in 
which they received the treatment. Figure 2 presents the comparable industry-by-industry productivity 
growth figures for the same two-group classification. Although the patterns are not as stark as in Figure 
1, both figures provide illustrative evidence that the General Tariff may have had expansionary effects 
on treated industries during the 1930-35 period, a result that is confirmed by the difference-in-difference 
regression results. 
Figure 1: Output Growth across Industries, 1924-30 and 1930-35 
 
Note: Plot of industry-by-industry annual net output growth in the two periods – 1924-30 (horizontal axis) and 1930-35 
(vertical axis). The groups are formed using the two-group classification detailed in appendix A. 
                                                          
8 Corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix B.1. 
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Figure 2: Productivity Growth across Industries, 1924-30 and 1930-35 
 
Note: Plot of industry-by-industry annual net output per worker growth in the two periods – 1924-30 (horizontal axis) and 
1930-35 (vertical axis). The groups are formed using the two-group classification detailed in appendix A. 
 
Table 1 reports formal econometric results for average annual real output, productivity and 
employment growth using the two-group classification, confirming the visual inspection of Figures 1 
and 2. In column (1), we estimate that the average annual output growth for non-newly protected 
industries in 1930-35 was not significantly different to 1924-30. The results highlight the importance 
of accounting for initial conditions; we find that between 1924 and 1930 the average annual output 
growth for newly protected industries was 2.82 percentage points lower than for the non-newly 
protected industries over the same period, significant at the 5 percent level. Notably, the difference-in-
difference coefficient indicates that the tariff had an expansionary treatment effect of 4.07 percentage 
points per annum on treated industries, significant at the 5 percent level. The size of this treatment effect 
more than offset the output growth shortfall of newly protected industries in 1924-30. 
In column (2), we estimate that the tariff also had an expansionary effect on the labour 
productivity growth of newly protected industries. In 1924-30, the productivity of non-newly protected 
industries grew a 3.01 percent per annum, a figure that did not significantly change in 1930-35. 
Productivity growth of the newly protected industries was 1.46 percentage points per annum less than 
their non-newly protected counterparts in 1924-30. The difference-in-difference coefficient indicates 
that, between 1930 and 1935, the tariff had an expansionary impact on productivity growth of 2.16 
percentage points per annum, more than reversing the relative productivity growth shortfall in the earlier 
period, significant at the 10 percent significance level. 
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In column (3), we estimate the two-group classification with annual employment growth as the 
dependent variable. We do not find that the General Tariff had a significant treatment effect on the 
employment growth of newly protected industries in 1930-35. 
Taken together, the differing significance of treatment effects for productivity and employment 
growth identified in columns (2) and (3), indicates that the net output of newly protected industries 
predominantly increased because of productivity improvements rather than shifts in employment 
demand/supply. 
 
Table 1: Difference-in-Difference Results for the Two-Group Classification 
 (1) 
Net Output 
Growth 
(2) 
Net Output per 
worker Growth 
(3) 
Employment 
Growth 
D-in-D for Newly Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿 
4.066** 
(1.783) 
2.161* 
(1.131) 
1.841 
(1.124) 
Dummy Variable for Newly 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽 
-2.822** 
(1.087) 
-1.459* 
(0.800) 
-1.298* 
(0.698) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 𝛼𝛼�1 0.064 
(1.641) 
0.131 
(0.925) 
-0.056 
(0.981) 
Constant, 𝛼𝛼�0 4.221*** 
(0.982) 
3.013*** 
(0.654) 
1.158** 
(0.580) 
    
Observations 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.098 0.057 0.042 
Note: Estimated regression results for the two-group classification. In column (1), the dependent variable is 
annualised average (real) net output growth (in annualised percentage points). The corresponding dependent 
variables in columns (2) and (3) are annualised average net output per worker growth and employment growth 
respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported, where *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
3.2 Three-Group Classification 
The three-group classification allows for a more detailed examination of the effects of differing 
tariff protection rates. As in the two-group analysis, our control group includes industries that were both 
early protected and zero-protected.9 For our baseline three-group classification, we separate the newly 
protected industries into two treated sub-groups: (i) newly protected industries at the 10 percent ad 
valorem rate; and (ii) newly protected industries with tariffs at additional rates in excess of 10 percent 
ad valorem. The three-group model can be specified as: 
                                                          
9 We show that our results are robust when the control group is varied to contain only unprotected industries and 
only early protected industries in turn in Appendix B.5. 
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Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 × 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 × 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
the two time periods, and the dependent variable Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and the time dummy 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 are defined 
analogously to the two-group classification. The time-invariant explanatory variables 𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 and 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 
are dummy variables set equal to unity if industry 𝑖𝑖 was newly protected at the 10 percent rate or at an 
additional rate respectively (and zero otherwise). Thus, the coefficients 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  and 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  are the 
difference-in-difference estimators for the 10 percent and additionally protected industries respectively, 
representing the average effect of the tariff on each sub-group of newly protected industries relative to 
all non-newly protected industries. The parameters are defined as: 
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  = �𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 0��
− �𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 1�
− 𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 0�� 
𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  = �𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 1� − 𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 0��
− �𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 1�
− 𝐸𝐸�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 = 0�� 
Like Figures 1 and 2 for the two-group classification, Figures 3 and 4 visually illustrate the logic 
of our three-group classification.10 In Figure 3, plotting annual output growth, the proportion of newly 
protected industries, both at the 10 percent rate (indicated by a red cross) and additional rates (indicated 
by a green square), lying above the 45-degree ray clearly exceeds the proportion lying below. That is, 
the number of newly protected industries that experienced faster annual output growth between 1930 
and 1935, the period in which they received the tariff treatment, exceeds the number that grew faster 
between 1924 and 1930. In contrast, the growth of non-newly protected industries (indicated by a blue 
circle) is more varied, with numerous observations above and below the 45-degree ray.  
Figure 4 presents the comparable productivity growth figures for the three-group classification. 
Again, a large fraction of newly protected industries—especially those protected with additional rates—
lie above the 45-degree ray, indicating that the General Tariff had expansionary effects on treated 
industries during the 1930-35 period.11  
 
  
                                                          
10 Corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix B.1. 
11 In Figures 3 and 4, we label “Sugar and Glucose” to emphasise that they may potentially act as outliers in our 
econometric setup. We present formal analysis in Appendix B.7 to reflect this. Importantly, our headline results 
are robust to the removal of Sugar & Glucose from our sample. Appendix B.8 also shows that our headline results 
are robust to the weighting of industries by their size. 
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Figure 3: Output Growth across Industries, 1924-30 and 1930-35 
 
Note: Plot of industry-by-industry annual net output growth in the two periods – 1924-30 (horizontal axis) and 1930-35 
(vertical axis). The groups – non-newly, ten percent and additionally protected – are formed using the three-group classification 
detailed in appendix A. 
 
Figure 4: Productivity Growth across Industries, 1924-30 and 1930-35 
 
Note: Plot of industry-by-industry annual net output per worker growth in the two periods – 1924-30 (horizontal axis) and 
1930-35 (vertical axis). The groups – non-newly, ten percent and additionally protected – are formed using the three-group 
classification detailed in appendix A of this paper. 
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The regression results, reported in Table 2, confirm the insights from visual inspection of Figures 
3 and 4 for the three-group classification. Panels A, B and C present the results for the regressions with 
real output growth, productivity growth and employment growth as the dependent variables 
respectively. The baseline results for the three-group classification are in column (1) of each panel. 
Columns (2)-(5) report regression results with additional control variables included to account for 
potential differences in industry characteristics over and above their interwar growth profile (these 
controls are explained further below and in Appendix B.2).12  
In column (1) we find that average real output growth for non-newly protected industries was 
4.22 percent in 1924-30. This figure did not change significantly in 1930-35. In 1924-30, industries that 
received a 10 percent tariff rate in 1932 grew more slowly than non-newly protected industries, by 1.56 
percentage points per annum. The tariff did have a positive effect on these industries (2.27 percentage 
points per annum) but both these effects are statistically insignificant. In contrast, the output effect of 
the tariff on additionally protected industries is statistically significant, and positive. In particular, the 
additionally protected industries grew at 3.07 percentage points per annum less than non-newly 
protected industries in 1924-30. This growth loss is more than reversed in 1930-35, as the relevant 
difference-in-difference coefficient indicated that the treatment effects of the tariff on these industries 
was 4.42 percentage points per annum, significant at the 5 percent level. 
We also find that the tariff had a positive treatment effect on the productivity of additionally 
protected industries in 1930-35, significant at the 10 percent level. The productivity of additionally 
protected industries grew at 1.67 percentage points per annum less than non-newly protected industries 
in 1924-30, a growth loss that is more than reversed in 1930-35. The treatment effect for 1930-35 is 
estimated to be 2.55 percentage points per annum for additionally protected industries, relative to non-
newly protected industries. For comparison, using their classification, Broadberry and Crafts (2011) 
estimate that additionally protected industries growth was 2.3 percentage points per annum higher than 
the growth of early protected industries, although their estimate is statistically insignificant. The tariff 
effect on the productivity of 10 percent protected industries is positive, but not statistically significant. 
As with the two-group classification, we find that the tariff did not have a significant effect on 
the employment growth rates of either the ten percent or additional rate industries. As in the two-group 
classification, this indicates that the tariff predominantly boosted the output of UK manufacturing 
industries through productivity improvements, rather than through labour market mechanisms. 
In columns (2)-(5) of Table 2, we report the results with additional controls included in the 
regression. These controls are intended to capture otherwise unobserved features of industries that may 
simultaneously be correlated with the tariff treatment and their output, productivity or employment 
growth. That is, they are intended to capture industry features that may have caused differential changes 
in growth rates across industry groups absent the General Tariff, which, if unaccounted for, might bias 
estimates of the difference-in-difference coefficients.  
                                                          
12 We present similar robustness exercises for the two-group classification in appendix B.3. 
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Table 2: Difference-in-Difference Results for the Three-Group Classification 
Panel A: Net Output Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
4.419** 
(1.792) 
4.437** 
(2.135) 
5.474** 
(2.585) 
4.390** 
(1.871) 
4.436** 
(1.782) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
2.272 
(2.825) 
2.373 
(3.180) 
5.362 
(3.808) 
1.851 
(2.915) 
2.197 
(2.836) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
-3.070*** 
(1.082) 
-2.657** 
(1.159) 
-4.058*** 
(1.335) 
-2.693** 
(1.018) 
-2.995*** 
(1.044) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-1.562 
(1.960) 
-1.329 
(2.193) 
-6.163*** 
(2.322) 
-1.116 
(2.123) 
-1.477 
(1.942) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
0.064 
(1.649) 
2.725 
(2.514) 
-3.307 
(3.734) 
0.922 
(2.431) 
0.151 
(1.697) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 4.221*** 
(0.986) 
1.699 
(1.523) 
6.588*** 
(2.250) 
4.481*** 
(1.905) 
3.904*** 
(0.932) 
      
Control Variables Included None Census of 
Production 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.103 0.149 0.361 0.124 0.108 
Panel B: Net Output per worker Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
2.554* 
(1.348) 
2.694* 
(1.599) 
3.762* 
(2.037) 
2.497* 
(1.398) 
2.585** 
(1.302) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
0.161 
(1.832) 
-0.115 
(1.905) 
2.497 
(2.616) 
-0.475 
(1.891) 
0.126 
(1.754) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
-1.674** 
(0.770) 
-1.743** 
(0.798) 
-2.538** 
(1.142) 
-1.512** 
(0.694) 
-1.504** 
(0.743) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-0.367 
(1.210) 
-0.349 
(1.243) 
-2.335 
(1.848) 
-0.015 
(1.275) 
-0.192 
(1.153) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
0.131 
(1.230) 
2.454 
(1.745) 
-2.517 
(2.848) 
1.036 
(1.858) 
0.119 
(1.154) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 3.013*** 
(0.706) 
2.195*** 
(0.803) 
4.423** 
(1.945) 
2.995** 
(1.387) 
2.329*** 
(0.687) 
      
Control Variables Included None Census of 
Production 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.065 0.130 0.248 0.098 0.111 
Panel C: Employment Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
1.797 
(1.132) 
1.658 
(1.345) 
1.611 
(1.639) 
1.813 
(1.256) 
1.788 
(1.147) 
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D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
2.064 
(2.056) 
2.431 
(2.316) 
2.701 
(2.438) 
2.265 
(2.178) 
2.021 
(2.029) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
-1.327* 
(0.705) 
-0.849 
(0.877) 
-1.424 
(1.040) 
-1.122 
(0.786) 
-1.420** 
(0.697) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-1.154 
(1.392) 
-0.940 
(1.582) 
-3.656** 
(1.577) 
-1.063 
(1.527) 
-1.237 
(1.339) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
-0.056 
(0.985) 
0.312 
(1.772) 
-0.694 
(2.983) 
-0.120 
(1.286) 
0.037 
(1.150) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 1.158** 
(0.582) 
-0.523 
(1.439) 
2.091 
(1.700) 
1.410 
(0.892) 
1.512** 
(0.590) 
      
Control Variables Included None Census of 
Production 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.043 0.104 0.367 0.067 0.058 
Notes: Estimated regression results for the three-group classification. In panel A, the dependent variable is annualised average 
(real) net output growth. The corresponding dependent variables in panels B and C are annualised average net output per worker 
growth and employment growth, respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported, 
where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Details of the control variables are presented in Appendix B.2. 
 
Because data constraints limit the possible control variables, all controls are time invariant and 
are included in the regression alongside an interaction with the time dummy 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡. When augmented 
with additional industry-specific control variables 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖, the regression framework has the following form: 
Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 × 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 × 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡) +𝛾𝛾1𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2(𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 × 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 These controls are intended to capture otherwise unobserved features of industries that may 
simultaneously be correlated with the tariff treatment and their output, productivity or employment 
growth. That is, they are intended to capture industry features that may have caused differential changes 
in growth rates across industry groups absent the General Tariff.  
The regression results with control variables included serve to reinforce our main conclusion: 
industries that received additional protection under the 1932 General Tariff received a significant output 
and productivity benefit relative to the control group. 
In column (2), we report the regression results with a set of control variables for the 13 different 
sectors as defined by the Census of Production. That is, we have a dummy variable for each sector of 
the economy that is set to unity if that industry is classed within that sector according to the Census of 
Production, and zero otherwise. To the extent that industries within the same sector may co-move, but 
differ from other sectors, or be subject to similar tariff protection within sectors, this control variable 
can capture time-varying, industry-specific influences, as well as potential non-random tariff 
assignment. Column (2) illustrates that the tariff effects for additionally protected industries for net 
output growth and net output per worker growth are robust to the inclusion of controls for industry-
sector groups. The Census of Production sector dummies capture limited sectoral heterogeneity. There 
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may still be heterogeneity of industries within each sector which could better be accounted for. In 
column (3), we report the results using a more disaggregated classification from Barna (1952) with 29 
sectors. The results in column (3) indicate that the tariff effects for additionally protected industries are 
robust to these time-varying controls. 
In addition to sector dummies, columns (4) and (5) present regression results with additional 
control variables to account for specific features of industries, which may simultaneously be correlated 
with the growth of an industry as well as the tariff protection they received. In column (4) we use control 
variables from Kitson and Solomou (1990), which classify industries as resource intensive, labour 
intensive, scale intensive, an industry with differentiated products, or a food, drink and tobacco industry. 
Similarly, in column (5), we define control variables for industries that were more or less intensively 
using electricity as an input to production. Importantly, the headline results are robust to the inclusion 
of these control variables. Again, these control variables are intended to capture industry features that 
may have led to differences in their evolution absent the General Tariff. 
Additionally, Appendix B.7 presents a robustness exercise which accounts for industries whose 
output and employment growth over the 1924-35 period could be considered as potential outliers. These 
robustness regressions can be interpreted as difference-in-difference regressions with a larger ‘region 
of common support’ between treatment and control variables (Ravallion, 2008). Importantly, our 
headline results are robust to the omission of outliers. 
 
3.3 Medium-Term Effects of the General Tariff  
The previous results suggest a positive short-term output and productivity effect arising from the 
General Tariff during the period 1930-35. Extending the Census of Production data to include the 1948 
Census allows us to investigate whether the expansionary effects of the tariff persisted over time. To 
investigate the medium-term time profile of the effect we combine industry-level output and 
employment data from the 1948 Census of Production, with our existing data from the 1924, 1930 and 
1935 censuses. Of the 109 industries in our baseline sample for the 1924-35 period, 103 remain in the 
1948 sample.13 We estimate the effect of the tariff using the three-group classification, redefining the 
second period in the sample as the 1930-48 period (instead of 1930-35). The dependent variables remain 
the average annual growth of real output, productivity and employment over each period.  
 
  
                                                          
13 The descriptive statistics for the period 1930-48 are provided in Appendix B.1, where the distribution of 
industries across tariff groups is also provided. 
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Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Results for the Three-Group Classification for 1924-30 and 
1930-48 
 (1) 
Net Output 
Growth 
(2) 
Net Output 
per worker 
Growth 
(3) 
Employment 
Growth 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
3.118** 
(1.317) 
1.838** 
(0.879) 
1.190 
(0.946) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
1.887 
(2.496) 
0.950 
(1.437) 
0.882 
(1.977) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
-3.083*** 
(1.140) 
-1.744*** 
(0.792) 
-1.264* 
(0.732) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
-1.902 
(2.089) 
-0.501 
(1.294) 
-1.345 
(1.472) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-48, 𝛼𝛼�1 -1.598 
(1.174) 
-1.785*** 
(0.797) 
0.240 
(0.791) 
Constant, 𝛼𝛼�0 4.206*** 
(1.041) 
3.107*** 
(0.723) 
1.043* 
(0.605) 
    
Observations 206 206 206 
R-squared 0.060 0.065 0.044 
Note: Estimated regression results for the three-group classification. In column (1), the dependent 
variable is annualised average (real) net output growth. The corresponding dependent variables in 
columns (2) and (3) are annualised average net output per worker growth and employment growth 
respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported, where *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table 3 indicates that the 1932 General Tariff had medium-term expansionary effects for 
additionally protected industries.14 Column (1) illustrates that the tariff treatment effect for the output 
growth of additionally protected industries was 3.12 percent per annum, a result that is significant at 
the 5 percent significance level. The corresponding treatment effect of productivity of 1.84 percent per 
annum, in column (2), is also significant at the 5 percent level. As expected, the magnitude of these 
effects are slightly smaller than the short-term effects reported in Table 2, but they remain large and 
significant.  
 
  
                                                          
14 We report robustness exercises for this regression in appendix B.4 showing that this result is robust to the 
inclusion of controls. 
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4 Conclusions 
The application of the difference-in-difference model to the analysis of the policy impact of the 
General Tariff on British industry has provided new insights. Refining the tariff classification into three 
groups adds value to the analysis of UK tariffs during the 1930s, allowing us to distinguish between the 
10 percent tariff rate and additional tariff rates. This three-group comparison clearly suggests that the 
treatment effect of the General Tariff was large and statistically significant only for the additionally 
protected industries. This effect is identified over the short-run when we consider the inter-period 
comparisons between 1924-30 and 1930-35, but a similar effect is also identified over the medium-term 
when we consider the inter-period comparisons between 1924-30 and 1930-48. The Import Duties 
Advisory Committee (IDAC) viewed additional tariff rates as a mechanism for helping industries to 
restructure to help them compete during the 1930s. The positive output and productivity effects that we 
identify suggest that they were effective in achieving some of their aims. 
The results reported in this study show that tariffs can have positive effects under specific 
circumstances. This UK-interwar case study should be viewed against the backdrop of a global 
depression, a unique British position of unilateral free trade and a tariff policy that targeted particular 
industries via the role of the IDAC. Using industry-level data, we identify that some benefits for the 
relative output and productivity growth of newly protected industries did arise under these specific 
circumstances. Given that the newly protected sector formed a very large proportion of the UK 
industrial output this is likely to result in positive effects on the UK industrial sector.   
This study has used disaggregated level data to analyse the effects of tariffs on British industries 
during the 1930s. Although there have been attempts to relate industry-level tariffs and economic 
growth at the aggregate level, such results cannot be mechanically applied to the inter-war period. For 
example, Lehmann and O’Rourke (2011) used a panel data set for 10 countries over the period 1870-
1914 and found a positive relationship between industry tariffs and economic growth; however, they 
also argue that this relationship is likely to change over time.   
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Appendix A – Tariff Classification 
Table A1 presents the updated classification of industry-specific tariff rates. In the table, we 
provide a detailed description of the new data set, and document the differences between our 
classification and that of Broadberry and Crafts (2011). We construct the classification by drawing upon 
contemporary tariff information from a variety of sources, including: IDAC (1932a, 1932b), CET 
(1935), NIESR (1943), Hutchinson (1965) and various HMRC reports. 
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Table A1: Tariff Protection Received by the Industries in the Census of Production during the Interwar Period 
 
Industry 
Number 
Industry Broadberry 
& Crafts 
(BC) 
Classification 
Newly 
Protected 
in 1932 
(=1) 
1932 
Duty/Additional 
Duty 
Sources 
Sector: Textiles 
101 Cotton Spinning >10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 8), CET (1935, p. 56). 
Hutchinson (1965, p. 180) refers to these industries in Group VIII (1), 
“Manufactures wholly or partly of cotton, wool”. 
102 Cotton Weaving >10% 1 20% 
103 Woollen & 
Worsted 
>10% 1 20% 
104 Silk & Artificial 
Silk 
Early 
Protected 
0 25% IDAC (1932a, p. 3): 
“The Silk Duties, both customs and excise, were imposed for revenue purposes 
in 1925, being selected on grounds of luxury. They are levied at various rates, 
specific and ad valorem, on artificial and natural silk, and their products, running 
up to 33.3% or more.” 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134, summarises the history of silk duties from 1925. 
105 Linen & Hemp >10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 8).  Hutchinson (1965, p. 180) refers to these industries in 
Group VIII (1) “Manufactures wholly or partly of […] linen”. 
106 Jute 0-10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 8), CET (1935, p. 57). Hutchinson (1965, p. 180) refers to 
these industries in Group VIII (1) “Manufactures wholly or partly of […] jute”.15 
107 Hosiery >10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 9), CET (1935, p. 59). Hutchinson (1965, p. 181) refers to 
these industries in Group IX (1), “Articles of apparel of all kinds”. 
NIESR (1945, p. 46), Group XIII: “This group consists of all articles of apparel 
and footwear, and a duty of 20% is charged on all articles not separately listed.” 
108 Textile Finishing >10% 1 20% 
109 Lace Not in BC 
Sample 
0 20% Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134, summarises the history of lace duties from 1925. 
A 33.3% ad valorem on lace was imposed on 1 July 1925 which lapsed on 30 
June 1930.  
IDAC (1932a, p, 4) points out that “Under the White Paper procedure, duties 
were imposed for a period of five years at the rate of 33.3% ad valorem on lace”. 
                                                          
15 Although NIESR (1945, pp. 50-52) references jute as an exemption from the Import Duties Act, 1932, the Census of Production refers to manufactures made “wholly or partly of […] 
jute”, for which the tariff rate was 20%. 
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IDAC (1932b, p. 8), CET (1935, p. 58) report a 20% duty from 1932.  
Hutchinson (1965, p. 180) refers to industries in Group VIII (1), “Tissue and like 
materials of any width, shape, or length (including lace)”. 
110 Rope, Twine & 
Net 
0-10% 1 15% IDAC (1932b, p. 9), CET (1935, p. 58) report duties on Rope and Twine (15%) 
and Net (20%). 
Hutchinson (1965, p. 181) refers to these industries in Group VIII(4) and (5): 
“(4) Cordage, cables, ropes and twine other than coir yarn (including hard fibre 
singles, polished, starched or glazed singles, and all multiples) wholly or partly 
of vegetable fibre other than cotton, linen, ramie or seagrass. 
“(5) Nets and netting made wholly or partly of material dutiable under the 
heading (4) above.” 
111 Elastic Webbing Not in BC 
Sample 
1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 8), CET (1935, p. 56). Hutchinson (1965, p. 180) list this in  
Group VIII(1)(i) 
“Tissue and like materials of any width, shape, or length (including […] 
webbing)”. 
112 Coir Fibre, Horse 
Hair & Feather 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 9), CET (1935, p. 58, p. 60).  Hutchinson (1965, p. 180) lists 
this in Group VIII(3) “Coir mats and matting”  
 “Feathers and all manufactured articles complete or incomplete, containing 
feathers or down”. 
113 Flock & Rag 0-10% 1 10% IDAC (1932b, p. 8), CET (1935, p. 56) report that this industry is expressly 
excluded from additional duty. Hutchinson (1965, p. 180): notes, “Tissue and 
like materials of any width, shape, or length ([…], but not including rags)”. 
114 Packing Not in BC 
Sample 
0 20% Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134, describes a 16.66% duty on Packing from 1925 
which lapsed on 30 April 1930.  
IDAC (1932a, p. 4) notes that “Under the White Paper procedure, duties were 
imposed for a period of five years […] at the rate of 16.66% on packing and 
wrapping paper”. 
115 Canvas Good 
Sack 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 9), CET (1935, p. 58). Hutchinson (1965, p. 180) lists this in 
Group VIII (2), “Sacks, and bags of a shape similar to sacks, wholly or partly of 
vegetable fibre.” 
116 Engine Boiler 
Packing 
Not in BC 
Sample 
1 10% This industry is not included in Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134, which summarises 
the history early- protected industries. 
IDAC (1932b) and CET (1935) do not report an additional tariff. Hence, by 
deduction, the industry is assumed to have the 10% rate imposed in 1932. 
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117 Roofing Felt 0-10% 1 10% Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 91, shows a revenue tariff from Asphalt and Bitumen 
of 10% under the General tariff. 
Sector: Food, Drink & Tobacco 
201 Grain Milling 0-10% 1 10% This was Liable to duty under the 1932 Ottawa Agreements. 
CET (1932, p. 99): Wheat in grain receives specific duty; Maize a 10 per cent ad 
valorem duty. 
202 Bread & Cakes 0-10% 0 0% CET (1935, p. 30) lists this as an exemption: 
“Confectionary containing sugar or cocoa, being composite goods some (but not 
all) of the components of which are chargeable with Customs duty by or under 
an enactment other than the Import Duties Act, 1932, except the following 
articles when imported as:- Cakes and biscuits.” 
203 Biscuit 0-10% 0 0% CET (1935, p. 30) lists this as an exemption: 
“Confectionary containing sugar or cocoa, being composite goods some (but not 
all) of the components of which are chargeable with Customs duty by or under 
an enactment other than the Import Duties Act, 1932, except the following 
articles when imported as:- Cakes and biscuits.” 
204 Cocoa, Sugar & 
Confectionary 
0-10% 0 Specific duties Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134: Cocoa and Sugar faced pre-war revenue tariffs 
that continued with amendments into the 1920s and 1930s. 
CET (1935, p. 30) notes that  Confectionary was “liable to duty at the rate of 10 
per cent ad valorem in addition to any other duties (e.g., Sugar duty) payable on 
the goods.” 
205 Bacon, Wring & 
Sausage 
0-10% 1 30% CET (1935, p. 7) notes “Bacon […] may not be imported except under Board of 
Trade licence.” 
CET (1935, p. 29): Sausages liable to additional duty from 1932. 
206 Preserved Foods Not in BC 
Sample 
1 25% IDAC (1932b, p. 4), CET (1935, p. 24; p. 28).  
Hutchison (1965, p. 175) lists additional tariffs for this category as Class I(4)-
(5):  
“(4) Fruit preserved by chemicals or artificial heat, other than fruit preserved in 
sugar. [25%] 
“(5) Vegetables (other than tomatoes) preserved in air-tight containers, but not 
including pickles and vegetables preserved in vinegar. [20%]” 
CET (1935, p. 28): Fruit preserved in sugar or syrup “chargeable with Sugar 
duty plus a duty of 25 per cent ad valorem.” 
25 
 
207 Butter & Cheese Not in BC 
Sample 
1 15% Butter and cheese were subject to a duty on foreign goods and imperial 
preference (with free entry) under the Ottawa Agreements Act, 1932 (CET, 
1935, p. 99; NIESR, 1945, p.47):  
“On butter there is a specific duty of 15s. per cwt. and on cheese an ad valorem 
rate of 15%.” 
The tariff revenue data reported in Cmd. 5296 (1936) suggest that import tariff 
revenues from foreign countries collapsed following Ottawa. 
208 Fish Curing 0-10% 1 10% Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 83 reports disaggregated revenue tariffs from cured or 
salted fish at 10-12% in the period 1932-5 suggesting that the 10% rate was 
dominant for this category. 
209 Cattle, Dog & 
Poultry 
0-10% 1 10% There are some restrictions on the import of live animals (CET, 1935, p. 7). 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 83 reports disaggregated revenue tariffs from poultry 
and live animals at 10% for the  period 1932-5. 
210 Ice 0-10% 1 10% No reference to Ice in any additional rate list or in any exemption list. Hence, by 
deduction, the industry is assumed to have the 10% rate imposed in 1932. 
211 Sugar & Glucose 0-10% 0 Specific duties Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134: Sugar faced pre-war revenue tariffs that continued 
with amendments into the 1920s and 1930s. 
212 Brewing & 
Malting 
0-10% 0 Specific duties Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134 lists the pre-war specific duties affecting this 
industry together with the amendments during the 1920s and 1930s. 
213 Spirit Rectifying 
etc. 
0-10% 0 Specific duties Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134 lists the pre-war specific duties affecting this 
industry together with the amendments during the 1920s and 1930s. 
NIESR (1945, p. 49): 
“There are specific duties […] on the following spirits when imported in cask 
after having been warehoused for three years or more: brandy and rum, 
sweetened and unsweetened liquors, cordials and mixtures, imitation rum, 
Geneva, naptha, and methyl alcohol.” 
214 Wholesale 
Bottling 
0-10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 5) and CET (1935, p. 33). 
Hutchison (1965, pp. 176-177)  reports an additional tariff for: 
“Glass bottles and glass jars, including glass stoppers, but not including 
scientific glassware.” 
215 Aeriated Water 
etc. 
0-10% 0 Specific duties (CET, 1935, p. 222) mentions table water as being subject to a specific duty. 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134 notes a specific duty of 8d  per gallon introduced 
on 1st May 1916 and continued into the 1920s and 1930s. 
216 Spirit Distilling 0-10% 0 Specific duties Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134 lists the pre-war specific duties affecting this 
industry together with the amendments during the 1920s and 1930s. This is 
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confirmed by NIESR (1945, p. 49): “There are specific duties […] on the 
following spirits when imported in cask after having been warehoused for three 
years or more: brandy and rum, sweetened and unsweetened liqueurs, cordials 
and mixtures, imitation rum, Geneva, naptha, and methyl alcohol.” 
217 Tobacco 0-10% 0 Specific duties Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134 lists the pre-war specific duties affecting this 
industry together with the amendments during the 1920s and 1930s. This is 
confirmed by NIESR (1945, p. 50): 
“On unmanufactured tobacco the duties are 9s. 6d. or 10s. 6d. when unstripped, 
and an extra 1/2d. when stripped. The higher duties are charged when the 
tobacco contains less than 10% of moisture.” 
Sector: Clothing 
301 Tailoring & 
Dressmaking 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 9), CET (1935, p. 59). Hutchinson (1965, p. 181) Group IX(1) 
reports an additional duty for “Articles of apparel of all kinds”. 
302 Boot & Shoe >10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 9), CET (1935, p. 59). Hutchinson (1965, p. 181): Group IX(2) 
reports an additional duty for “Boots, bootees, shoes, over-shoes, slippers and 
sandals of all descriptions and of whatever material, finished or unfinished, and 
shaped parts and laces therefor.” 
303 Hat & Cap >10% 1 30% IDAC (1932b, p. 9), CET (1935, p. 59 and p. 61). Hutchinson (1965, p. 181): 
Group IX(1) reports an additional duty for  “Articles of apparel of all kinds”. 
304 Gloves Early 
Protected 
0 33.3%/ 
30% 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134 lists Gloves as Key Industry Duty. This was 
renewed at 33.3% ad valorem on 22 December 1925 and lapsed in 21 December 
1930. During the 1930s this came under the remit of the General Tariff. CET 
(1935, p. 61) lists this in Group IX (4) and (5) as an Additional Duty from 1932. 
305 Umbrellas & 
Walking Sticks 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 14), CET (1935, p. 79).  Hutchison (1965, p. 186), Group 
XVI(20-21) reports an additional duty for: 
“(20) Umbrella and sunshades and covers, and parts are fittings therefor. 
“(21) Walking sticks (including canes) and parts and fittings therefor.” 
306 Fur Not in BC 
Sample 
1 30% IDAC (1932b, p. 13), CET (1935, p. 74). Hutchison (1965, p. 185), Group 
XVI(6-7) reports an additional duty for: 
“(6) Fur and other skins, including pieces (dressed), except leather. [15%] 
“(7) Goods manufactured wholly or partly of fur skin, including any skin with 
fur, hair or wool attached. [30%]” 
Sector: Iron  
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401 Blast Furnace16 Not in BC 
Sample 
1 33.3% NIESR (1945, p. 44): “Duties of 33.3% ad valorem are charges on spiegeleisen 
and most types of pig iron.”17,18 CET (1935, p. 86): Schedule II. 
402 Smelting & 
Rolling19 
>10% 1 33.3% IDAC (1932b, p. 14), CET (1935, pp. 81-84). Hutchison (1965, p. 186), 
Schedule II(2) reports an additional duty for: “Iron and Steel (other than pig iron, 
but including alloy steel) of the following descriptions: 
“(i) Ingots […] 
“(iii) Sheet and tinplate bars. 
“(iv) Bars, rods, angles, shapes and sections of all kinds, whether fabricated or 
not.” 
403 Foundries20 >10% 1 33.3% IDAC (1932b, p. 14), CET (1935, p. 85). Hutchison (1965, p. 186), Schedule 
II(2) reports an additional duty for: “Iron and Steel (other than pig iron, but 
including alloy steel) of the following descriptions: […] 
“(vi) Casting, in the rough or machined”. 
404 Tinplate >10% 1 33.3% IDAC (1932b, p. 14), CET (1935, p. 83). and Hutchison (1965, p. 186): 
Schedule II(2) reports an additional duty for: “Iron and Steel (other than pig iron, 
but including alloy steel) of the following descriptions: […] 
 “(iii) Sheet and tinplate bars.” 
405 Wrought Iron & 
Steel 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 6), CET (1935, p. 37). Hutchison (1965, p. 177), Group II(6) 
reports an additional duty for: “Iron and Steel products” regularly constructed 
with wrought iron and steel. 
406 Wire >10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 6), CET (1935, p. 37) Hutchison (1965, p. 177), Group II (6) 
(iv) reports an additional duty for: “Iron and Steel products of the following 
descriptions: […] 
“(iv) Wire, wire netting, wire nails, and cable and rope”. 
407 Chain, Nail & 
Screw 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 6), CET (1935, pp. 37-38).  Hutchison (1965, p. 178), Group 
II(6)(v) reports an additional duty for: “Iron and Steel products of the following 
descriptions: […] 
                                                          
16 The main product for this industry is pig iron. (Source: Kitson and Solomou, 1990) 
17 “There are two different rates of duty applied to nearly all iron and steel products according to whether the goods are or are not imported from a Cartel country and covered by a quota 
certificate. All products from Cartel countries eligible for the preferential rate are subject to an ad valorem duty of 10%. Products imported from other countries are subject to duties as 
follows:” higher ad valorem rates. (Source: NIESR, 1945, p. 44) 
18 Pig iron smelted with charcoal was exempt from the Import Duties Act, 1932 (CET, p. 15), but smelting with charcoal was largely replaced with coke smelting in the 19th century. 
19 The main products for this industry are steel ingots and castings, steel bars, rods and angles. (Source: Kitson and Solomou, 1990) 
20 The main products for this industry are iron and steel castings. (Source: Kitson and Solomou, 1990) 
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“(v) Screws, nails, tacks, studs and spikes.” 
408 Hardware & 
Hollowware 
Early 
Protected 
0 20% IDAC (1932a, p.4) notes that this was protected “Under Part II of the 
Safeguarding Industries Act, duties of 33.3% ad valorem were imposed for a 
period of five years in […] domestic hollow-ware (aluminium and enamelled)”. 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134 notes that this was changed to 25% ad valorem 
rate in 1928 (this lapsed on 12 June 1933). 
In the 1930s these industries were given additional tariffs: IDAC (1932b, p. 6), 
CET (1935, p. 36) and Hutchison (1965, p. 177): Group II(2): 
“Hollow-ware (other than baths) of iron or steel (including tinned plate).” 
409 Cutlery Early 
Protected 
0 20% Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134, notes that this industry was protected with a 
33.3% Duty from 1925 (lapsed 21 December, 1930). 
IDAC (1932b, p. 7), CET (1935, p. 44) and Hutchison (1965, p. 178), Group IV 
(1) report an additional duty for Cutlery. 
410 Tool & 
Implement 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 7), CET (1935, p. 46). Hutchison (1965, p. 178), Group IV (4) 
reports an additional duty for: “(i) Forks, shovels, spades, scythes, sickles and 
agricultural implements, and parts thereof. (ii) Other tools are parts thereof.” 
411 Needle Pin 
Smallware 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 7), CET (1935, p. 46). Hutchison (1965, p. 178), Group IV (4) 
(ii) reports an additional duty for: “(ii) Other tools are parts thereof.” 
412 Small Arms Not in BC 
Sample 
1 25% Arms and Ammunition could only be imported under a Board of Trade licence 
(CET, 1935, p. 7; NIESR, 1945, p. 265). Of those imported, additional rates 
were levied (IDAC, 1932b, p. 12; CET, 1935, p. 72; Hutchison, 1965, p. 184): 
Group XVI(1): “Arms and ammunition” including sporting guns, military rifles, 
miniature rifles, air guns, revolvers and loaded cartridges. 
Sector: Engineering Trades 
501 Mechanical 
Engineering 
>10% 1 20% NIESR (1945, p. 45): Group X 
“There is a general rate of 20% ad valorem on machinery, but there are many 
exemptions to it. For example a duty of only 15% is imposed on machines for 
domestic and household purposes, cash registers, dry cleaning and laundering 
machines, office machinery, petrol pumps, electric refrigerators, agricultural 
machinery, milking machines and other dairy machinery.” 
CET (1935, p. 48): Group VI(1) Machinery 
502 Electrical 
Engineering 
>10% 1 20% NIESR (1945, p.45): Group IX 
“The duty on accumulators and heating and cooking apparatus is 15% ad 
valorem, but on all other electrical goods it is 20%.” 
CET (1935, pp. 47-48): Group V(1) Electrical Goods 
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503 Shipbuilding 0-10% 0 0% NIESR (1945, pp. 50-51): 
“Certain classes of goods are exempted from all duties and others are exempted 
from duty under particular Acts, but remain liable to duty under other Acts. […] 
Under the Import Duties Act the following classes of goods are exempted from 
duty under Part 3 of the tariff: […] 
“(1) Goods consigned direct to a shipbuilding yard and which will be used for 
the building, repairing or refitting of ships in that yard. 
“(2) Goods of certain classes when imported for the use in the construction or 
repair of the boilers or propelling machinery of ships, or their accessories. […] 
“(6) Goods which form part of a ship or other vessel which is being imported for 
the purpose of being broken up, or any equipment or machinery of such a ship.” 
CET (1935, p. 11) 
504 Motor & Cycle Early 
Protected 
0 33.3% The McKenna Duties from 1915 covered Motor Vehicles (33.3% ad valorem). 
IDAC (1932a, p. 3) notes:  
“The McKenna Duties were imposed in 1915 for a variety of reasons mostly 
connected with the War. They cover motor vehicles, accessories and parts […] – 
the duties in all these cases being 33.3% ad valorem”. 
505 Aircraft 0-10% 1 10% Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 91 p. 144 groups Aircraft tariff revenue with Other 
Vehicles under the General Tariff legislation. The industry does not figure in any 
of the additional Tariff information provided by IDAC (1932b) and Hutchison 
(1965) or in the pre-1932 duties as outlined in CET (1935). This leads us to 
deduce that the baseline 10% rate was applied to Aircraft.21 
506 Railway Carriage 
& Wagon 
>10% 1 33.3% NIESR (1945, p. 46): Group XVII: “A duty of 33.3% ad valorem is imposed on 
railway wagons”.  
CET (1935, p. 40): Group II (6) (x): “Wagons for use on railways”. 
507 Carriage Cart & 
Wagon 
0-10% 1 10% No reference to Carriage Cart & Wagon in any additional rate lists or in any 
exemption list. Hence the 10% rate of the General tariff is assumed. 
Sector: Non-Ferrous Metals 
601 Copper & Brass Not in BC 
Sample 
1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 6), CET (1935, p. 42) and Hutchison (1965, p. 178), Group III 
(2): “Articles manufactures wholly or partly of the metals aluminium, copper, 
lead, nickel, tin, zinc and alloys including any of these metals”. 602 Aluminium, Lead & Tin 
Not in BC 
Sample 
1 20% 
                                                          
21 In personal correspondence Professor David Edgerton has pointed out that most of the output of the British Aircraft industry went to the RAF. Imperial Airways, the chosen 
instrument, bought British. The firms that joined together to form British Airways did buy Dutch, German and US aircraft on a very small scale. 
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603 Finished Brass Not in BC 
Sample 
1 20% 
604 Gold & Silver Not in BC 
Sample 
0 0% NIESR (1945, pp. 50-52): 
“Certain classes of goods are exempted from all duties and others are exempted 
from duty under particular Acts, but remain liable to duty under other Acts. […] 
Under the Import Duties Act the following classes of goods are exempted from 
duty under Part 3 of the tariff: […] 
“(7) Goods specifically exempted under the Act. The list of these goods covers 
ten pages of the Customs and Excise Tariff, and includes: […] gold and silver 
bullion and coin”. 
605 Plate & Jewellery >10% 1 30% NIESR (1945, p. 47): “Most jewellery is liable to a duty of 30%.” 
IDAC (1932b, p. 13) and Hutchison (1965, p. 185): Group XVI(8) 
“Jewellery and imitation jewellery, whether gemset or not.” 
CET (1935, p. 74): Group XVI(8): “Jewellery and imitation jewellery, whether 
or not mounted or set” 
There are some jewellery exemptions (CET, 1935, p. 15), though none involve 
metallic jewellery. 
606 Watch & Clock Early 
Protected 
0 33.3% IDAC (1932a, p. 3): “The McKenna Duties were imposed in 1915 for a variety 
of reasons mostly connected with the War. They cover […] clocks and watches 
[…] – the duties in all these cases being 33.3% ad valorem”. 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134, notes that this duty lapsed in 1924 but was 
reintroduced at 33.3% ad valorem on 1 July 1925 (lapsed 21 December, 1930). 
Sector: Chemical & Allied Trades 
701 Chemical Dyes & 
Drugs 
Early 
Protected 
0 33.3% IDAC (1932a, p. 3): “[T]he Key Industry Duties […] cover a wide range of 
commodities such as […] organic chemicals”. CET (1935, pp. 13-14). 
702 Seed Crushing 0-10% 1 15% CET (1935, p. 35): Class II (1): Seed oil is subject to a duty of 15 per cent ad 
valorem chargeable under the Ottawa Agreements. 
CET (1935, p. 101) lists Castor, Coconut, Ground-nut, Linseed, Rape, Sesamum 
and Cod Liver Oils among those with duty in excess of 10% under the Ottawa 
Agreements. 
703 Oil & Tallow 0-10% 0 0% CET (1935, pp. 12-16): “Goods specifically exempted by the Import Duties Act, 
1932, and Treasury Orders made thereunder, viz.:- 
“Natural but not Terpeneless Essential Oils” 
704 Fertiliser 
Disinfectant Glue 
>10% 1 20% NIESR (1945, p. 46): Group XIV 
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“This group includes a short list of chemicals many of which are used for 
domestic or agricultural purposes. Most of them are dutiable at a rate of 20% ad 
valorem, but in a few cases duties as low as 15% and as high as 33.3% are 
imposed. Fertilisers are mainly subject to specific duties, the most common rate 
being £4 per ton. […] There are alternative duties on glue etc. of 10s. 6d. per 
cwt. Or 25% ad valorem.” Kitson and Solomou (1990) note that 17% of traded 
output was covered by Key Industry Duties but most were newly-protected in 
1932. 
CET (1932, p. 80), Group XVI (28): “Glue” shall receive a duty of “10s. 6d. a 
cwt. or to 25 per cent of the value of the goods, whichever is the greater”. 
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Soap, Candle, 
Perfume 
>10% 1 20% NIESR (1945, p. 46), Group XIV:  
“This group includes a short list of chemicals many of which are used for 
domestic or agricultural purposes. Most of them are dutiable at a rate of 20% ad 
valorem, but in a few cases duties as low as 15% and as high as 33.3% are 
imposed. On most types of soap the duty is 15%, but on toilet soap it is 30%.” 
IDAC (1932b, p. 10), CET (1935, p. 66) and Hutchison (1965, p. 182): Group 
XI(1-2) 
“(1) Candles […] [20%] 
“Soap, including abrasive soap, soap powder and soap flakes, but not including 
toilet soap.” [20%] 
IDAC (1932b, p. 12) and Hutchison (1965, p. 184): Group XVI(2) 
“Toilet Soap” [30%] 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 83, shows a revenue tariff rate with additional duties 
for perfumery. 
706 Starch Polishes 0-10% 1 10% No explicit reference to Starch Polishes in either (i) early protected, or (ii) 
additionally protected lists of the Import Duties Act, 1932. Thus, by deduction 
the industry is assumed to have a 10% ad valorem tariff rate imposed in 1932. 
707 Paint Colour 
Varnishes 
>10% 1 20% NIESR (1945, p. 46): Group XIV:  
“This group includes a short list of chemicals many of which are used for 
domestic or agricultural purposes. Most of them are dutiable at a rate of 20% ad 
valorem, but in a few cases duties as low as 15% and as high as 33.3% are 
imposed. […] The duties on paint vary from 15 to 20% ad valorem.” 
IDAC (1932b, p. 10), CET (1935, p. 66) and Hutchison (1965, p. 182): Group X 
(29): “Paints and Colours”. 
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708 Explosives & 
Fireworks 
Early 
Protected 
0 Early Protected Fireworks were exempt from duty. NIESR (1945, p. 52) notes: 
“Under the Safeguarding of Industries Act 1921, and the Finance Acts of 1922, 
1926 and 1936, the following classes of goods are exempt from duty under Part 
5: […] fireworks.  
Fireworks are approximately 20% of output for this industry (Kitson and 
Solomou, 1990) 
Explosives Regulated by Licence. CET (1935, p. 8): “Explosives may not be 
imported except under Home Office licence” 
709 Match Early 
Protected 
0 Specific duties NIESR (1945, pp. 48-49): “This Part consists of various duties which have been 
imposed at different times under special enactments. Many of them were 
originally for revenue purposes under the Finance Acts. […] 
“There is a specific duty [… on] matches”. 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134, notes specific duties in 1916, 1918 and 1927. 
710 Ink, Gum, Wax Not in BC 
Sample 
1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 14), CET (1935, pp. 78-79). Hutchison (1965, p. 186), Group 
XVI (19) notes additional duties: “Stationary (other than paper), including 
writing ink and ink powder, […], sealing wax”. 
711 Petroleum Early 
Protected 
0 Specific duties IDAC (1932a, p. 3):  
“The customs duty on Hydrocarbon Oils was imposed […] in 1928.” 
Sector: Leather 
801 Fellmongery >10% 1 15% IDAC (1932b, p. 13), CET (1935, p. 74) and Hutchison (1965, p. 185): Group 
XVI (6-7): “(6) Fur and other skins, including pieces (dressed), except leather.” 
802 Leather Tanning 0-10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 11), CET (1935, p. 67) and Hutchison (1965, p. 182): Group 
XII 
“(1) Leather, dressed (other than patent, varnished, japanned and enamelled and 
glace kid). [15%] 
“(2) Saddlery and harness (including horse boots) wholly or partly of leather. 
[20%] 
“(3) Trunks, bags, wallets, pouches and other receptacles made wholly or partly 
of leather or material resembling leather whether fitted or not. [25%]”  
803 Leather Goods 0-10% 1 20% 
Sector: Paper 
901 Paper >10% 0 20% Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134, describes a 16.66% duty on Paper from 1925 
which lapsed on 30 April 1930.  
IDAC (1932a, p. 4) notes that “Under the White Paper procedure, duties were 
imposed for a period of five years […] at the rate of 16.66% on packing and 
wrapping paper” 
902 Wallpaper >10% 0 20% 
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IDAC (1932b, p. 11), CET (1935, p. 67) and Hutchison (1965, p. 183), Group 
XIII (1-2) note additional tariffs for paper in the early 1930s, such that total 
protection was 20% ad valorem. 
903 Printing & Books Not in BC 
Sample 
0 0% NIESR (1945, pp. 50-52): 
“Certain classes of goods are exempted from all duties and others are exempted 
from duty under particular Acts, but remain liable to duty under other Acts. […] 
Under the Import Duties Act the following classes of goods are exempted from 
duty under Part 3 of the tariff: […] 
“(7) Goods specifically exempted under the Act. The list of these goods covers 
ten pages of the Customs and Excise Tariff, and includes: […], printed trade 
catalogues and lists, manuscripts and typescripts […] maps”. 
CET (1935, pp. 12-17): “Goods specifically exempted by the Import Duties Act, 
1932, and Treasury Orders thereunder, viz.:- 
“Maps […] Newspapers, periodicals, printed books 
“Printed parts of newspapers, of periodicals and of printed books […]. 
“Printed publications”. 
904 Print & Publish 
Newspaper 
Not in BC 
Sample 
0 0% NIESR (1945, pp. 50-52): 
“Certain classes of goods are exempted from all duties and others are exempted 
from duty under particular Acts, but remain liable to duty under other Acts. […] 
Under the Import Duties Act the following classes of goods are exempted from 
duty under Part 3 of the tariff: […] 
“(7) Goods specifically exempted under the Act. The list of these goods covers 
ten pages of the Customs and Excise Tariff, and includes: […], newsprint”. 
CET (1935, pp. 12-17): “Goods specifically exempted by the Import Duties Act, 
1932, and Treasury Orders thereunder, viz.:- 
“Newspapers, periodicals, printed books.  
“Printed parts of newspapers, of periodicals” 
905 Manufactured 
Stationary 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 14), CET (1935, pp. 78-79) and Hutchison (1965, p. 186): 
Group XVI (19): “Stationary (other than paper)”. 
906 Cardboard Box >10% 0 20% Cmd. 5296 (1936), Table 134, describes a 16.66% duty on Packing from 1925 
which lapsed on 30 April 1930.  
IDAC (1932a, p. 4) notes that “Under the White Paper procedure, duties were 
imposed for a period of five years […] at the rate of 16.66% on packing and 
wrapping paper”. 
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IDAC (1932b, p. 11), CET (1935, p. 67) and Hutchison (1965, p. 183): Group 
XIII (1-2) show that additional duties were given to “[B]oard made from paper 
or pulp” such that total protection was 20% ad valorem. 
907 Pens & Pencils >10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 14), CET (1935, pp. 78-79)   and Hutchison (1965, p. 186): 
Group XVI(19): “Stationary (other than paper), including […], pencils, pencil 
leads and crayons, pen nibs, fountain pens, stylographic and other pens”. 
Sector: Miscellaneous 
1001 Rubber Early 
Protected 
0 33.3% Kitson and Solomou (1991): tyres, which comprise 70% of industry output, were 
covered by the McKenna duty. 
IDAC (1932a, p. 3): 
“The McKenna Duties were imposed in 1915 for a variety of reasons mostly 
connected with the War. They cover motor vehicles, accessories and parts […] – 
the duties in all these cases being 33.3% ad valorem”. 
 
1002 Linoleum & 
Oilcloth 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 13), CET (1935, p. 75). Hutchison (1965, p. 185), Group XVI 
(13) notes additional tariffs for “Felt base floor covering, linoleum and oilcloth.” 
1003 Musical 
Instruments 
Early 
Protected 
0 33.3% IDAC (1932a, p. 3): “The McKenna Duties were imposed in 1915 for a variety 
of reasons mostly connected with the War. They cover […] musical instruments 
[…] – the duties in all these cases being 33.3% ad valorem”. 
1004 Games & Toys >10% 1 25% IDAC (1932b, p. 14), CET (1935, p. 77) and Hutchison (1965, pp. 185-186): 
Group XVI(17-18): 
“(17) Appliances, apparatus, accessories and requisites for sports, games, 
gymnastics and athletics and parts thereof. 
“(18) Toys of all kinds and parts thereof”. 
1005 Sports Requisites >10% 1 25% IDAC (1932b, p. 14), CET (1935, p. 77) and Hutchison (1965, pp. 185-186): 
Group XVI(17): “Appliances, apparatus, accessories and requisites for sports, 
games, gymnastics and athletics and parts thereof.” 
1006 Scientific 
Instruments 
Early 
Protected 
0 33.3% IDAC (1932a, p. 3): “[T]he Key Industry Duties […] cover a wide range of 
commodities such as optical and scientific instruments […]. The duty is in most 
cases 33.3% ad valorem. 
1007 Cinematographic 
Film Printing 
Early 
Protected 
0 Specific duties IDAC (1932a, p. 3): “The McKenna Duties were imposed in 1915 for a variety 
of reasons mostly connected with the War. They cover […] cinematograph films 
at specific rates.” 
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1008 Incandescent 
Mantles 
Early 
Protected 
0 33.3% IDAC (1932a, p. 4): “Under Part II of the Safeguarding Industries Act, duties of 
33.3% ad valorem were imposed for a period of five years in each case on […] 
gas mantles.” 
1009 Fancy Goods 0-10% 1 20% Cmd. 5296 (1936), displays the revenue tariff for fancy goods which shows an 
additional rate. 
1010 Coke & By-
Products 
0-10% 0 0% NIESR (1945, pp. 50-52): 
“Certain classes of goods are exempted from all duties and others are exempted 
from duty under particular Acts, but remain liable to duty under other Acts. […] 
Under the Import Duties Act the following classes of goods are exempted from 
duty under Part 3 of the tariff: […] 
“(7) Goods specifically exempted under the Act. The list of these goods covers 
ten pages of the Customs and Excise Tariff, and includes: […], coal and coke”. 
CET (1935, p. 12): “Goods specifically exempted by the Import Duties Act, 
1932, and Treasury Orders thereunder, viz.:- 
“Coal, coke”. 
1011 Manufactured 
Fuel 
0-10% 0 Specific duties IDAC (1932a, p. 3): “The customs duty on Hydrocarbon Oils was imposed […] 
in 1928.” 
1012 Brush >10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 13), CET (1935, p. 75) and Hutchison (1965, p. 185): Group 
XVI(11): “Brooms and brushes of all descriptions.” 
1013 Manufactured 
Abrasives 
>10% 1 20%/ 
15% 
Aluminium Oxide, a common manufactured abrasive, is listed with an additional 
duty in CET (1935, p. 65) of “£3 per ton, or to 20 per cent of the value of the 
goods, whichever is the greater”. 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), displays the revenue tariff for Manufactured Abrasives as a 
group which shows an additional rate of 15% ad valorem. 
Sector: Timber 
1101 Timber >10% 1 20% 
IDAC (1932, p. 8), CET (1935, pp. 52-54) and Hutchison (1965, pp. 179-180): 
Group VII 
“Articles manufactures wholly or partly of wood and timber (not including 
planed or dressed wood and timber, staves, sleepers, plywood and veneers 
imported as such): 
“(i) Builders’ woodwork, including window frames, doors, gates etc., and parts 
thereof. [15%] 
“(ii) All other manufactures of wood and timber [20%]”. 
1102 Furniture & 
Upholstery 
>10% 1 20% 
1103 Wooden Cases Not in BC 
Sample 
1 20% 
1104 Coopering Not in BC 
Sample 
1 20% 
1105 Basket & 
Wicker-Work 
Not in BC 
Sample 
1 20% 
Sector: Clay & Building Materials 
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1201 Brick & Fireclay 0-10% 1 10% Brick and clay are expressly excluded from the additional duties in IDAC 
(1932b, p. 4, Group I(1)), CET (1935, p. 31) and Hutchison (1965, p. 176, Group 
I(1)): “except bricks of brick earth or clay and refractory goods”. 
1202 China & 
Earthenware 
>10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 4) and Hutchison (1965, p. 176): Group I(1)(i) 
“All other pottery and clay products”. 
CET (1935, p. 31): Group I 
1203 Cement 0-10% 1 10% IDAC (1932b) and CET (1935) do not report an additional tariff. Hence, by 
deduction, the industry is assumed to have the 10% rate imposed in 1932. 
1204 Glass >10% 1 20% IDAC (1932b, p. 5), CET (1935, p. 32) and Hutchison (1965, pp. 176-177): 
Group I(2): “Glass and Glassware”. 
1205 Building 
Materials 
0-10% 1 20% Capie, Table 8.1 lists a nominal protection rate of 20% for Building Materials. 
Roofing Tiles: 15% (CET, p. 31; Class III, Group I(1)(i)). 
CET (1935) lists a range of building materials with additional rates. 
Cmd. 5296 (1936), displays the revenue tariff for a variety of building materials 
which shows a prevalence of additional rates. 
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Appendix B – Robustness Analysis 
B.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table B1 presents the salient descriptive statistics for the two-group classification of non-newly 
and newly protected industries. It documents the average of compounded annual (net) output and (net) 
output per worker growth rates for the two groups in turn.22 The average annual net output and net 
output per worker growth of the non-newly protected industries is similar in both the 1924-30 and 1930-
35 periods. In contrast, the output and output per worker growth of the newly protected industries show 
marked time variation. The average annual output growth for the non-newly and newly protected groups 
in 1924-30 was 4.22 and 1.40 percent respectively. In 1930-35 the figure for the non-newly protected 
group remains stable at 4.29 percent, while the output growth of newly protected industries jumps to 
5.53 percent. Over the 1930-48 period, the average annual net output and net output per worker growth 
of all industries is lower than in 1930-35, reflecting the fact that much of growth over the period up to 
1935 was cyclical growth. The output and productivity growth of non-newly protected industries is 
comparable to that of newly protected industries over this period. Given the differences in the initial 
period (1924-30), this is indicative that the tariff might have had medium-term effects on treated 
industries. 
 
Table B1: Difference in Output and Productivity Growth across Two Groups, 1924-30, 1930-35 
and 1930-48, Mean (and Standard Deviation) of Net Output and Net Output per worker Growth 
(in Constant Prices) 
 Net Output Growth Net Output per worker Growth 
 Non-Newly 
Protected 
Newly Protected Non-Newly 
Protected 
Newly Protected 
1924-1930 
1930-1935 
1930-1948 
4.22% (0.99) 1.40% (0.47) 3.01% (0.71) 1.55% (0.31) 
4.29% (1.32) 5.53% (0.52) 3.14% (1.01) 3.85% (0.41) 
2.61% (0.54) 2.64% (0.37) 1.32% (0.34) 1.47% (0.17) 
Note: Average annual growth rate for all industries in the given classification. Non-newly protected industries include both 
industries that were protected prior to 1932 and those that were unprotected for the whole period. In the 1924-30 and 1930-
35 period, there are 36 non-newly protected and 73 newly protected industries in our sample. In 1930-48, the corresponding 
numbers of firms in our sample are 34 and 69 respectively. 
 
Table B2 presents the analogous descriptive statistics for the three-group classification, which 
includes industries that were: non-newly protected (control), newly protected at 10 percent, and newly 
protected with additional duties. The table refines the intuition described using the two-group 
classification and highlights that the greatest output and productivity benefits from the tariff were 
received by industries with additional duties. On average, industries protected at the 10 percent rate did 
not see increases in growth from 1924-30 to 1930-35 that matched those of additionally protected 
industries. This pattern is particularly striking for productivity (see panel B of table B2). 
 
                                                          
22 The annual growth rates for each group in table A1 are not weighted by industry size. The figures reported here 
differ from Kitson and Solomou (1990) who report weighted growth rates. 
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Table B2: Differences in Output and Productivity Growth across Three Groups, 1924-30, 1930-
35 and 1930-48, Mean (and Standard Deviation) of Net Output and Net Output per worker 
Growth (in Constant Prices) 
 Panel A: Net Output Growth 
 Non-Newly Protected Ten Percent Duty Additional Duties 
1924-30 4.22% (0.99) 2.66% (1.74) 1.15% (0.44) 
1930-35 4.29% (1.32) 4.99% (1.59) 5.63% (0.54) 
1930-48 2.61% (0.54) 2.59% (1.29) 2.64% (0.37) 
 Panel B: Net Output per worker Growth 
 Non-Newly Protected Ten Percent Duty Additional Duties 
1924-30 3.01% (0.71) 2.65% (1.01) 1.34% (0.31) 
1930-35 3.14% (1.01) 2.94% (0.96) 4.02% (0.46) 
1930-48 1.32% (0.34) 1.77% (0.55) 1.42% (0.18) 
Note: Average annual growth rate for all industries in the given classification. Non-newly protected industries include both 
industries that were protected prior to 1932 and those that were unprotected for the whole period. In the 1924-30 and 1930-
35 period, there are 36 non-newly protected industries, 12 industries protected at the 10 percent rate and 61 industries with 
additional tariff protection. In 1930-48, the corresponding numbers of firms in our sample are 34, 11 and 58 respectively. 
 
B.2  Control Variables 
The regressions reported in columns (2)-(5) of Table 2 include control variables that are intended 
to capture otherwise unobserved features of industries that may simultaneously be correlated with the 
tariff treatment and their output, productivity or employment growth. That is, they are intended to 
capture industry features that may have caused differential changes in growth rates across industry 
groups absent the General Tariff. Because data constraints limit the possible control variables, all 
controls are time-invariant and are included in the regression alongside an interaction with the time 
dummy 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 to account for potential time-varying effects. In this appendix, we describe the sets of 
control variables reported in Table 2. Four classification schemes were considered, each providing 
different levels of aggregation: 
 
Census of Production Sectoral Classification  The first set of control variables we use, in 
column (2) of Table 2, groups industries into the sectors defined by the Census of Production. That is, 
we have a dummy variable for each sector of the economy that is set to unity if that industry is classed 
within that sector in the Census of Production, and zero otherwise. In our dataset there are 109 
industries, which are split up into 13 sectors.23 Table B3 presents a list of the sectors, and the industries 
that comprise them. To the extent that industries within the same sector may co-move, but differ from 
other sectors, or be subject to similar tariff protection within sectors, this control variable can capture 
time-varying, industry-specific influences, as well as potential non-random tariff assignment. 
 
Table B3: Sectoral Breakdown of Industries in the Census of Production 
Sector Industries in the Sector 
Textiles Cotton Spinning; Cotton Weaving; Woollen & Worsted; Silk & Artificial Silk; Linen & 
Hemp; Jute; Hosiery; Textile Finishing; Lace; Rope, Twine & Net; Elastic Webbing; 
Coir Fibre, Horse Hair & Feather; Flock & Rag; Packing; Canvas Good Sack; Engine 
Boiler Packing; Roofing Felt. 
                                                          
23 There are 12 dummy variables to avoid the problem of perfect multicollinearity. 
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Food, Drink and 
Tobacco 
Grain Milling; Bread & Cakes; Biscuit; Cocoa, Sugar & Confectionary; Bacon, Wring 
& Sausage; Preserved Foods; Butter & Cheese; Fish Curing; Cattle, Dog & Poultry; Ice; 
Sugar & Glucose; Brewing & Malting; Spirit Rectifying etc.; Wholesale Bottling; 
Aeriated Water etc.; Spirit Distilling; Tobacco. 
Clothing Tailoring & Dressmaking; Boot & Shoe; Hat & Cap; Glove; Umbrellas & Walking 
Sticks; Fur. 
Iron Blast Furnace; Smelting & Rolling; Foundries; Tinplate; Wrought Iron & Steel; Wire; 
Chain, Nail & Screw; Hardware & Hollowware; Cutlery; Tool & Implement; Needle Pin 
Smallware; Small Arms. 
Engineering Trades Mechanical Engineering; Electrical Engineering; Shipbuilding; Motor & Cycle; 
Aircraft; Railway Carriage & Wagon; Carriage Cart & Wagon. 
Non-Ferrous 
Metals 
Copper & Brass; Aluminium, Lead & Tin; Finished Brass; Gold & Silver; Plate & 
Jewellery; Watch & Clock. 
Chemical & Allied 
Trades 
Chemical Dyes & Drugs; Seed Crushing; Oil & Tallow; Fertiliser Disinfectant Glue; 
Soap, Candle, Perfume; Starch Polishes; Paint Colour Varnishes; Explosives & 
Fireworks; Match; Ink, Gum, Wax; Petroleum. 
Leather Fellmongery; Leather Tanning; Leather Goods. 
Paper Paper; Wallpaper; Printing & Books; Print & Publish Newspaper; Manufactured 
Stationary; Cardboard Box; Pens & Pencils. 
Miscellaneous (Baseline Group) Rubber; Linoleum & Oilcloth; Musical Instruments; Games & Toys; 
Sports Requisites; Scientific Instruments; Cinematographic Film Printing; Incandescent 
Mantles; Fancy Goods; Coke & By-Products; Manufactured Fuel; Brush; Manufactured 
Abrasives. 
Timber Timber; Furniture & Upholstery; Wooden Cases; Coopering; Basket & Wicker-Work. 
Clay & Building 
Materials 
Brick & Fireclay; China & Earthenware; Cement; Glass; Building Material. 
 
Barna Input-Output Sectoral Classification  To develop a more disaggregated set of 
control variables to account for time-varying, industry-specific influences and potential non-random 
tariff assignment, we draw on the sectoral classification of industries from Barna (1952). Barna 
surveyed the structure of the British economy in the interwar period and classified industries into 29 
different sectors – the classification is presented in table B4 and is from Appendix A of Barna (1952). 
Barna’s 29 industry classification accounts for a large degree of heterogeneity across industries, whilst 
retaining sufficient degrees of freedom in the estimation. 
 
Table B4: Sectoral Breakdown of Industries in the Disaggregated Classification of Barna (1952) 
Sector Industries in the Sector 
Building Material Roofing Felt; Manufactured Abrasives; Brick & Fireclay; Cement; Building 
Material. 
China, Glass etc. China & Earthenware; Glass. 
Coke Coke & By-Products; Manufactured Fuel 
Chemicals etc. Chemical Dyes & Drugs; Fertiliser, Disinfectant, Glue; Explosives & Fireworks; 
Fancy Goods. 
Soap, Polishes etc. Soap, Candle, Perfume; Starch Polishes; Match. 
Oil & Paint Seed Crushing; Oil & Tallow; Paint Colour Varnishes; Petroleum; Ink Gum Wax. 
Iron & Steel Blast Furnace; Smelting & Rolling; Foundries; Tinplate; Wrought Iron & Steel. 
Non-Ferrous Metals Copper & Brass; Aluminium, Lead & Tin. 
Shipbuilding Shipbuilding. 
Mechanical Engineering Mechanical Engineering; Small Arms. 
Electrical Engineering Electrical Engineering. 
Motor & Cycle Motor & Cycle. 
Aircraft Aircraft. 
Railway Rolling Stock Railway Carriage & Wagon. 
Metal Goods  Wire; Chain, Nail & Screw; Hardware & Hollowware; Cutlery; Tool & Implement; 
Needle Pin Smallware; Carriage Cart & Wagon; Finished Brass; Gold & Silver; 
Plate & Jewellery; Watch & Clock; Scientific Instruments; Musical Instruments. 
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Cotton & Silk Cotton Spinning; Cotton Weaving; Silk & Artificial Silk. 
Woollen & Worsted Woollen & Worsted. 
Hosiery & Lace Hosiery; Lace. 
Other Textiles Linen & Hemp; Jute; Rope, Twine & Net; Elastic Webbing; Coir Fibre, Horse Hair 
& Feather; Flock & Rag; Canvas Good Sack ; Engine Boiler Packing. 
Textile Finishing & 
Packing 
Textile Finishing; Packing.  
Leather & Fur Fellmongery; Leather Tanning; Leather Goods; Fur. 
Clothing Tailoring & Dressmaking; Boot & Shoe; Hat & Cap; Glove; Umbrellas & Walking 
Sticks. 
Food Processing Grain Milling; Bread & Cakes; Biscuit; Cocoa, Sugar & Confectionary; Bacon, 
Wring & Sausage; Preserved Foods; Butter & Cheese; Fish Curing; Cattle, Dog & 
Poultry; Ice; Sugar & Glucose. 
Drink & Tobacco Brewing & Malting; Spirit Rectifying etc.; Wholesale Bottling; Aeriated Water 
etc.; Spirit Distilling; Tobacco. 
Manufactures of Wood Timber; Furniture & Upholstery; Wooden Cases; Coopering; Basket & Wicker-
Work. 
Paper Paper; Wallpaper; Manufactured Stationary; Cardboard Box. 
Printing & Publishing Printing & Books; Print & Publish Newspaper. 
Rubber Rubber 
Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 
(Baseline Group) Pens & Pencils; Linoleum & Oilcloth; Games & Toys; Sports 
Requisites; Cinematographic Film Printing; Incandescent Mantles; Brush.  
 
Kitson-Solomou Industry Classification  In addition to the sectoral control variables 
described above, which classify industries within sectors based on the output produced, we also use 
control variables that explicitly account for certain features of industries in columns (4) and (5) of Table 
2. These variables are intended to account for the possibility that the resource intensiveness of an 
industry may have influenced its evolution in the 1930s, independently of the General Tariff. The third 
set of control variables is from Kitson and Solomou (1990), who used the classification scheme of the 
OECD (1987), which groups industries according to the primary factors that affect competitiveness.   
The 109 industries are grouped into one of the following categories: resource intensive; labour 
intensive; scale intensive; an industry with differentiated products; the food, drink and tobacco industry 
is identified separately. The allocation of industries to each classification is listed in table B5.  
 
Table B5: Sectoral Classification of Industries from Kitson and Solomou (1990) 
Class Industry 
Resource Intensive Fur; Copper & Brass; Aluminium, Lead, Tin; Finished Brass; Gold & Silver; 
Petroleum; Fellmongery; Leather Tanning; Leather Goods; Paper; Coke By-
Products; Manufactured Fuel; Manufactured Abrasives; Timber; Wooden Cases; 
Basket & Wicker-work; Brik & Fireclay; Cement; Building Materials. 
Labour Intensive Cotton Spinning; Cotton Weaving; Woollen & Worsted; Silk & Artificial Silk; 
Linen & Hemp; Jute; Hosiery; Textile Finishing; Lace; Rope, Twine, Nets; Elastic 
Webbing; Coir Fibre, Horse Hair & Feather; Flock & Rage; Packing; Canvas Good 
Sack; Engine Boiler Packing; Roofing Felts; Tailoring & Dressmaking; Boot & 
Shoe; Hat & Cap; Glove; Umbrellas & Walking Sticks; Furniture & Upholstery; 
Coopering. 
Scale Intensive Blast Furnaces; Smelting & Rolling; Foundries; Tinplate; Wrought Iron & Steel; 
Wire; Chain, Nail & Screw; Hardware & Hollowware; Shipbuilding; Motor & 
Cycle; Aircraft; Railway Carriage & Wagon; Carriage Cart & Wagon; Chemical 
Dyes & Drugs; Seed Crushing Oil & Tallow; Fertiliser Disinfectant Glue; Soap 
Candle Perfume; Starch Polishes; Paint Colour Varnishes; Explosives & Fireworks; 
Match; Ink Gum Wax; Wallpaper; Print & Publish Newspapers; Manufactured 
Stationary; Cardboard Box; Pens & Pencils; Rubber; Linoleum & Oilcloth; China 
& Earthenware; Glass. 
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Differentiated Products Cutler; Tool & Implement; Needle Pin Smallware; Small Arms; Mechanical 
Engineering; Electrical Engineering; Plate & Jewellery; Watch & Clock; Musical 
Instruments; Games & Tors; Sports Requisites; Scientific Instruments; 
Cinematographic Film Printing; Incandescent Mantles; Plastic Materials; Brush. 
Food, Drink and 
Tobacco 
(Baseline Group) Grain Milling; Bread & Cakes; Biscuit; Cocoa, Sugar & 
Confectionary; Bacon, Wring & Sausage; Preserved Foods; Butter & Cheese; Fish 
Curing; Cattle, Dog & Poultry; Ice; Sugar & Glucose; Brewing & Malting; Spirit 
Rectifying etc.; Wholesale Bottling; Aeriated Water etc.; Spirit Distilling; Tobacco. 
  
Electricity Usage in Industry  The fourth and final set of control variables, used in column 
(5) of Table 2, accounts for the intensiveness of electricity use by each industry (measured as electricity 
usage per worker). Given the diffusion of electricity in the production process of interwar economies 
such a measure is a good proxy of the capital intensity of production across different industries. This 
control variable is likely to account for time-varying, industry-specific features, to the extent that 
industries with similar intensity of electricity usage intensities might be expect to grow in a similar 
manner during the interwar period. The electricity usage of an industry may have influenced its 
evolution in the 1930s, independently of the General Tariff. For instance, an industry that more readily 
adopted electricity in this period may have been expected to grow faster, even without the General 
Tariff. We define dummy variables for the upper and lower quantiles of Electricity per Worker Usage 
in 1930. The resulting classification is provided in Table B6. 
 
Table B6: Classification of Industries into Quartiles of Electricity per Worker Usage in 1930 
Quartile Industry 
Upper Silk & Artificial Silk; Grain Milling; Butter & Cheese; Ice; Sugar & Glucose; Spirit 
Distilling; Blast Furnace; Smelting & Rolling; Tinplate; Wrought Iron & Steel; Wire; 
Railway Carriage & Wagon; Copper & Brass; Aluminium, Lead & Tin; Gold & 
Silver; Chemical Dyes & Drugs; Seed Crushing; Oil & Tallow; Fertiliser Disinfectant 
Glue; Petroleum; Paper; Rubber; Linoleum & Oilcloth; Coke & By-Products; 
Manufactured Fuel; Cement; Glass; 
Lower Cotton Weaving; Hosiery; Lace; Elastic Webbing; Packing; Canvas Good Sack; Fish 
Curing; Aeriated Water etc.; Tobacco; Tailoring & Dressmaking; Boot & Shoe; Hat 
& Cap; Glove; Umbrellas & Walking Sticks; Fur; Watch & Clock; Leather Goods; 
Printing & Books; Manufactured Stationary; Cardboard Box; Games & Toys; Sports 
Requisites; Incandescent Mantles; Brush; Furniture & Upholstery; Basket & 
Wickerwork; China & Earthenware. 
 
B.3 Two-Group Classification with Controls 
In this appendix, and in appendix B.4, we report robustness regressions for the two-group 
classification (in Table 1) or the 1930-48 regression (in Table 3). Importantly, our headline results are 
robust to the inclusion of control variables.  
Table B7 presents the results from the two-group classification, discussed in section 3.1 of the 
main paper, with additional controls added to the regression to illustrate the robustness of the results. 
The results in columns (2)-(5) of table B7 serve to reinforce the primary conclusion reported in section 
3.1: newly protected industries received a significant output and productivity benefit from the 1932 
General Tariff. 
Panel A of table B7 illustrates that the estimated treatment effect of the tariff on output growth 
lies between 3.92 and 5.46 percentage points per annum. In all but one of the five regressions, the result 
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is significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated treatment effect is significant at the 10 percent level 
when the Census of Production sectoral classification is used in the set of controls. 
In panel B of table B7 the estimated treatment effect on the productivity growth of newly 
protected industries is between 1.94 and 2.19 percentage points per annum. This figure is significant at 
the 10 percent level in three of the five regressions, but is insignificant in the regressions where the 
Census of Production sectoral classification and the Kitson and Solomou classification are used as 
controls.  
 
Table B7: Difference-in-Difference Results for the Two-Group Classification with Controls for 
1924-30 and 1930-35 
Panel A: Net Output Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for Newly Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹� 
4.066** 
(1.783) 
4.045* 
(2.119) 
5.456** 
(2.603) 
3.915** 
(1.850) 
4.074** 
(1.769) 
Dummy Variable for Newly 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷� 
-2.822** 
(1.087) 
-2.405** 
(1.182) 
-4.393*** 
(1.401) 
-2.398** 
(1.045) 
-2.749*** 
(1.046) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
0.064 
(1.641) 
2.684 
(2.505) 
-3.294 
(3.727) 
-0.668 
(3.111) 
0.090 
(1.692) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 4.221*** 
(0.982) 
1.726 
(1.529) 
6.828*** 
(2.252) 
4.714*** 
(1.798) 
3.946*** 
(0.934) 
      
Control Variables Included None Census of 
Production 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.098 0.146 0.352 0.119 0.104 
Panel B: Net Output per worker Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for Newly Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹� 
2.161* 
(1.131) 
2.161 
(1.534) 
3.560* 
(2.007) 
1.941 
(1.358) 
2.188* 
(1.285) 
Dummy Variable for Newly 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷� 
-1.456* 
(0.800) 
-1.478* 
(0.781) 
-2.506** 
(1.170) 
-1.232* 
(0.696) 
-1.292* 
(0.745) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
0.131 
(0.925) 
2.397 
(1.746) 
-2.373 
(2.833) 
-1.814 
(1.909) 
0.052 
(1.150) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 3.013*** 
(0.654) 
2.223*** 
(0.794) 
4.400** 
(1.944) 
3.216** 
(1.323) 
2.365*** 
(0.684) 
      
Control Variables Included None Census of 
Production 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.057 0.121 0.246 0.086 0.102 
Panel C: Employment Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for Newly Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹� 
1.841 
(1.124) 
1.805 
(1.334) 
1.785 
(1.624) 
1.898 
(1.238) 
1.825 
(1.135) 
Dummy Variable for Newly 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷� 
-1.298* 
(0.698) 
-0.866 
(0.869) 
-1.779* 
(1.026) 
-1.111 
(0.782) 
-1.390** 
(0.683) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
-0.056 
(0.981) 
0.328 
(1.766) 
-0.818 
(2.993) 
1.087 
(2.076) 
0.044 
(1.145) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 1.158** 
(0.580) 
-0.525 
(1.429) 
2.345 
(1.737) 
1.419* 
(0.837) 
1.517** 
(0.591) 
      
Control Variables Included None Census of 
Production 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.042 0.102 0.353 0.066 0.057 
Notes: Estimated regression results for the two-group classification. In panel A, the dependent variable is annualised average 
(real) net output growth. The corresponding dependent variables in panels B and C are annualised average net output per worker 
growth and employment growth, respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported, 
where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Details of the control variables are presented in Appendix B.2. 
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B.4  Medium-Term Effects of the General Tariff with Controls 
Table B8 presents estimates of regressions using data from 1924-30 and 1930-48, with control 
variables, to study the medium-term effects of the General Tariff. Importantly, the results support the 
primary conclusion put forward in section 3.3: that the 1932 General Tariff had medium-run 
expansionary effects on the output and productivity growth of additionally protected industries. The 
relevant difference-in-difference coefficients for the additionally protected industries in panels A and 
B of Table B8 are significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
Table B8: Difference-in-Difference Results for the Three-Group Classification for 1924-30 and 
1930-48 with Controls 
Panel A: Net Output Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
3.118** 
(1.317) 
2.937** 
(1.437) 
3.920** 
(1.639) 
2.922** 
(1.271) 
3.158** 
(1.279) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
1.887 
(2.496) 
2.060 
(2.770) 
5.623** 
(2.789) 
1.957 
(2.689) 
1.603 
(2.478) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
-3.083*** 
(1.140) 
-2.658** 
(1.209) 
-4.047*** 
(1.344) 
-2.702** 
(1.070) 
-3.014*** 
(1.108) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-1.902 
(2.089) 
-1.904 
(2.315) 
-7.280*** 
(2.169) 
-1.511 
(2.278) 
-1.851 
(2.076) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-48, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
-1.598 
(1.174) 
-0.019 
(1.889) 
-3.359 
(2.805) 
-2.453 
(2.191) 
-1.113 
(1.152) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 4.206*** 
(1.041) 
1.214 
(1.572) 
6.581*** 
(2.276) 
5.503*** 
(1.284) 
3.850*** 
(0.966) 
      
Control Variables Included None Cens. of Prod. 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 
R-squared 0.060 0.162 0.519 0.124 0.093 
Panel B: Net Output per worker Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
1.838** 
(0.879) 
1.938** 
(0.937) 
2.662** 
(1.245) 
1.735** 
(0.829) 
1.777** 
(0.849) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
0.950 
(1.437) 
0.779 
(1.521) 
2.735 
(2.133) 
0.592 
(1.504) 
0.833 
(1.343) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
-1.744*** 
(0.792) 
-1.882** 
(0.800) 
-2.795** 
(1.111) 
-1.631** 
(0.715) 
-1.599** 
(0.762) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-0.501 
(1.294) 
-0.565 
(1.359) 
-2.780 
(1.948) 
-0.139 
(1.365) 
-0.404 
(1.205) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-48, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
-1.785*** 
(0.797) 
-0.309 
(1.053) 
-3.311 
(2.098) 
-1.517 
(1.576) 
-1.314 
(0.797) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 3.107*** 
(0.723) 
2.235*** 
(0.828) 
4.607** 
(1.916) 
4.422*** 
(0.834) 
2.384*** 
(0.697) 
      
Control Variables Included None Cens. of Prod. 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 
R-squared 0.065 0.164 0.355 0.100 0.145 
Panel C: Employment Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
1.190 
(0.946) 
0.908 
(1.093) 
1.128 
(1.371) 
1.104 
(1.001) 
1.289 
(0.943) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
0.882 
(1.977) 
1.218 
(2.135) 
2.690 
(2.052) 
1.306 
(2.103) 
0.710 
(1.934) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
-1.264* 
(0.732) 
-0.704 
(0.897) 
-1.147 
(1.070) 
-1.105 
(0.801) 
-1.339* 
(0.729) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-1.345 
(1.472) 
-1.282 
(1.635) 
-4.298*** 
(1.461) 
-1.318 
(1.600) 
-1.386 
(1.423) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-48, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
0.240 
(0.791) 
0.336 
(1.687) 
0.053 
(2.546) 
-0.848 
(1.165) 
0.265 
(0.873) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 1.043* -1.043 1.893 0.897 1.400** 
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(0.605) (1.522) (1.687) (0.933) (0.602) 
      
Control Variables Included None Cens. of Prod. 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 
R-squared 0.044 0.182 0.459 0.116 0.073 
Notes: Estimated regression results for the three-group classification. In panel A, the dependent variable is annualised average 
(real) net output growth. The corresponding dependent variables in panels B and C are annualised average net output per worker 
growth and employment growth, respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are reported, 
where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Details of the control variables are presented in Appendix B.2. 
 
B.5 Heterogeneity in the Control Group 
As a sensitivity test and a further refinement of the difference-in-difference model, we account 
for possible heterogeneity in our control group. As noted in the main body of the paper, our control 
group contains both early protected industries and industries that did not receive tariff protection in the 
interwar period. If these two sub-groups are significantly different, this heterogeneity may create biases 
in our headline results.24 To analyse the robustness of our results to this heterogeneity, we decompose 
our control group into two groups – unprotected and early protected industries – and investigate the 
treatment effect of the General Tariff. We show that our results and general conclusion – that the tariff 
had a large and significant treatment effect on additionally protected industries – are robust to this 
generalisation. To do this, we estimate the following regression: 
Δ𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 +  𝛼𝛼1𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 × 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡) +𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 × 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 × 𝑦𝑦35𝑡𝑡) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where, in addition to the definitions given in the main body of the paper, 𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable set 
equal to unity if an industry received protection early, in the 1920s, and remained unprotected during 
both the 1924-30 and 1930-35 periods. In this regression, the control group includes only those 
industries that were unprotected during both periods. Consequently, the difference-in-difference 
coefficients now capture the treatment effect of the General Tariff relative to the unprotected industries 
only. 
Formally, the coefficients have the following meaning. The intercept 𝛼𝛼0 captures the average 
annual output, productivity or employment growth of industries that were unprotected during the 
interwar period. The coefficient 𝛼𝛼1 captures the average additional annual growth of the unprotected 
industries in 1930-35 in excess of their 1924-30 growth. Therefore, the sum of 𝛼𝛼0 and 𝛼𝛼1 equals the 
total average annual output, productivity or employment growth for unprotected industries between 
1930 and 1935. The sum of 𝛼𝛼0  and 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒  is equal to the average annual output, productivity or 
employment growth for early protected industries in 1924-30, such that 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 captures the differential 
growth rates of early protected and unprotected industries over the 1924-30 period. Similarly, the sum 
of 𝛼𝛼0 and 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 (𝛽𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) denoted the average annual output, productivity or employment growth, between 
1924 and 1930, for industries that received a 10 percent (an additional) tariff under the 1932 legislation. 
                                                          
24 Early protected and unprotected industries may have evolved differently for a number of reasons. For example, 
as appendix A shows, some of the early protected industries received specific, not ad valorem, tariff protection in 
the 1920s. In the context of declining commodity and industrial prices in the early 1930s, this could have effects 
on the ad valorem equivalent tariffs that these early protected industries received, implying that they might not 
have been expected to evolve in a similar manner to unprotected industries. 
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Thus, the coefficients 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 , 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  and 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  are the difference-in-difference estimators for the early 
protected, 10 percent protected and additionally protected industries respectively, representing the 
average effect of the General Tariff on each sub-group relative to unprotected industries only – i.e. those 
that did not receive tariff protection at all between 1924 and 1935. 
Table B9 presents the results from this regression. Primarily, the results serve to reinforce our 
main conclusion: industries that received additional protection under the 1932 General Tariff received 
a significant output and productivity benefit relative to the unprotected control group. 
The results in Table B9 also ratify a maintained assumption in our baseline three-group 
classification: that the growth paths of early protected and unprotected industries were sufficiently 
similar in the 1924-30 and 1930-35 periods for them to be combined into a single control group, as is 
done in the main body of the paper. Indeed our estimates of 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 and 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 – coefficients that quantify 
the differential growth paths of unprotected and early protected industries in 1924-30 and 1930-35 
respectively – are insignificantly different from zero in all three regressions. That is, there is no 
significant difference between the early protected and unprotected industries, implying that 
heterogeneity in the control group in the three-group model does not bias the results. 
 
Table B9: Difference-in-Difference Results with only Unprotected Industries in the Control 
Group 
 (1) 
Net Output 
Growth 
(2) 
Net Output 
per worker 
Growth 
(3) 
Employment 
Growth 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
5.773** 
(2.816) 
3.410* 
(1.896) 
2.246 
(1.943) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
3.625 
(3.569) 
1.018 
(2.268) 
2.513 
(2.598) 
D-in-D for Early Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 
1.740 
(3.356) 
1.101 
(2.331) 
0.577 
(2.190) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
-1.938 
(1.615) 
-0.154 
(0.870) 
-1.712* 
(1.015) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
-0.430 
(2.304) 
1.153 
(1.280) 
-1.539 
(1.576) 
Dummy Variable for Early 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 
1.456 
(1.954) 
1.954 
(1.186) 
-0.495 
(1.168) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝛼𝛼�1 
-1.289 
(2.726) 
-0.725 
(1.812) 
-0.505 
(1.861) 
Constant, 𝛼𝛼�0 3.089** 
(1.552) 
1.493* 
(0.813) 
1.543* 
(0.933) 
    
Observations 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.114 0.089 0.043 
Note: Estimated regression results for with unprotected industries only in the control group, and 
three ‘treatment’ groups: additional tariff protected, 10 percent tariff protected, and early protected 
industries. In column (1), the dependent variable is annualised average (real) net output growth. 
The corresponding dependent variables in columns (2) and (3) are annualised average net output 
per worker growth and employment growth respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS 
and robust standard errors are reported, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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To complete this comparison, we also estimate a similar relationship with the early protected 
industries acting as the control group. The results from this regression are presented in Table B10. This 
amounts to viewing the same data from a different angle: estimating the effect of the tariff relative to 
the group of early protected industries. The two regressions in Tables B9 and B10 are equivalent – one 
can be attained by a linear transformation of the other. This is clear in that the R-squared values in the 
two models are identical. The output effect of the General Tariff on the additionally protected industries, 
relative to the early protected industries, is clearly large and well-identified in the 1920s (in terms of 
relative decline) and the 1930s (in terms of relative improvement). The productivity effect of the tariff 
on additionally protected industries, relative to the early protected group, is identified as a significant 
loss during the 1920s. Although the difference is not statistically different in the 1930s, the results 
suggest that, relative to the early protected industries, the productivity position of additionally protected 
industries underwent a relative improvement during the 1930s, as the relative decline of this group – 
seen in the 1920s – abates. These two angles also offer an insight on the three-group results in that the 
three-group classification captures the average of the effects presented in Tables B9 and B10. 
 
Table B10: Difference-in-Difference Results with only Early Industries in the Control Group 
 (1) 
Net Output 
Growth 
(2) 
Net Output 
per worker 
Growth 
(3) 
Employment 
Growth 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
4.033* 
(2.080) 
2.310 
(1.567) 
1.669 
(1.284) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
1.885 
(3.023) 
-0.083 
(2.002) 
1.936 
(2.150) 
D-in-D for Unprotected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢 
-1.740 
(3.356) 
-1.101 
(2.331) 
-0.577 
(2.190) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
-3.394*** 
(1.269) 
-2.108** 
(0.917) 
-1.217 
(0.807) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
-1.886 
(2.075) 
-0.801 
(1.312) 
-1.044 
(1.451) 
Dummy Variable for 
Unprotected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢 
-1.456 
(1.954) 
-1.954 
(1.186) 
0.495 
(1.168) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝛼𝛼�1 
0.451 
(1.957) 
0.376 
(1.465) 
0.072 
(1.156) 
Constant, 𝛼𝛼�0 4.545*** 
(1.187) 
3.447*** 
(0.864) 
1.048 
(0.702) 
    
Observations 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.114 0.089 0.043 
Note: Estimated regression results for with unprotected industries only in the control group, and 
three ‘treatment’ groups: additional tariff protected, 10 percent tariff protected, and early protected 
industries. In column (1), the dependent variable is annualised average (real) net output growth. 
The corresponding dependent variables in columns (2) and (3) are annualised average net output 
per worker growth and employment growth respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS 
and robust standard errors are reported, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
B.6 Three-Group Regression with Adjusted Group Definitions 
In the main body of the paper, we investigate the differences between industries in receipt of the 
10 percent tariff and those with additional protection. However, additional duties varied in size. As 
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appendix A shows, industries received ad valorem tariff protection ranging from 10 percent to 33 
percent. In this appendix, we estimate the robustness of our results to changes in the groupings of 
industries. This provides some insights about the extent to which the benefits of tariff protection were 
related to the tariff rate provided to each industry.  
First, we consider whether industries with tariff rates equal to or in excess of 20 percent  
(henceforth the ‘t ≥ 20’ group) behaved differently to those with tariff rates greater than or equal to 10 
percent, but less than 20 percent (henceforth the ‘10 ≤ t < 20’ group). Within our sample, 59 newly 
protected industries lie in the t ≥ 20 group, while 16 industries are in the 10 ≤ t < 20 group. The results 
are presented in columns (1)-(3) of Table B11, and illustrate that the treatment effect on output and 
productivity remains significant, at the 10 percent level, for industries in the t ≥ 20 group. Moreover, in 
comparison to industries in receipt of the 10 percent tariff only (see table 2), the difference-in-difference 
coefficients for the 10 ≤ t < 20 group are quantitatively larger. Thus, the results in columns (1)-(3) 
indicate that the higher rates of additional protection were associated with stronger output and 
productivity benefits. 
 
Table B11: Difference-in-Difference Results with Altered Classifications 
 (1) 
Net Output 
Growth 
(2) 
Net Output 
per worker 
Growth 
(3) 
Employment 
Growth 
(4) 
Net Output 
Growth 
(5) 
Net Output 
per worker 
Growth 
(6) 
Employment 
Growth 
D-in-D for ≥20% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
3.709* 
(1.900) 
2.673* 
(1.390) 
0.987 
(1.204) 
- - - 
D-in-D for 10≤t<20% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
3.674 
(2.654) 
2.181 
(1.864) 
1.443 
(1.772) 
3.674 
(2.666) 
2.181 
(1.873) 
1.443 
(1.781) 
D-in-D for =20% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
- - - 3.729* 
(1.922) 
2.896** 
(1.430) 
0.774 
(1.218) 
D-in-D for >20% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
- - - 3.635 
(2.468) 
1.881 
(1.648) 
1.741 
(1.843) 
Dummy Variable for 
≥20% Protected 
Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  
-2.809** 
(1.143) 
-2.009** 
(0.792) 
-0.728 
(0.733) 
- - - 
Dummy Variable for 
10≤t<20% Protected 
Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
-1.818 
(1.709) 
-0.822 
(1.073) 
-0.950 
(1.153) 
-1.818 
(1.717) 
-0.822 
(1.078) 
-0.950 
(1.159) 
Dummy Variable for 
=20% Protected 
Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  
- - - -2.740** 
(1.156) 
-2.158*** 
(0.820) 
-0.505 
(0.757) 
Dummy Variable for 
>20% Protected 
Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
- - - -3.054* 
(1.608) 
-1.484 
(0.907) 
-1.515 
(1.168) 
Dummy Variable for 
1930-35, 𝛼𝛼�1 
0.241 
(1.783) 
-0.188 
(1.287) 
0.431 
(1.067) 
0.241 
(1.791) 
-0.188 
(1.293) 
0.431 
(1.072) 
Constant, 𝛼𝛼�0 4.118*** 
(1.049) 
3.244*** 
(0.728) 
0.821 
(0.599) 
4.118*** 
(1.054) 
3.244*** 
(0.731) 
0.821 
(0.602) 
       
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.096 0.071 0.032 0.096 0.072 0.035 
Note: Estimated regression results for the three-group classification. In column (1), the dependent variable is annualised 
average (real) net output growth. The corresponding dependent variables in columns (2) and (3) are annualised average net 
output per worker growth and employment growth respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard 
errors are reported, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Of the 59 industries that comprise the t≥20 group, 46 received tariff protection at the 20 percent 
ad valorem rate. In columns (4)-(6) we extend the results from columns (1)-(3) and estimate the 
regression with three treatment groups: (i) the 10≤t<20 group; (ii) a group including newly protected 
industries that were protected at the 20 percent rate; and (iii) a group including industries that received 
tariffs in excess of 20 percent (henceforth the ‘t>20’ group). The results in columns (4) and (5) indicate 
that the tariff did have a significant positive impact on the growth of industries protected at the 20 
percent rate. The difference-in-difference coefficient for these industries is 3.73 percentage points for 
output growth and 2.90 percentage points for labour productivity growth; these coefficients are 
significant at the 10 and 5 percent levels respectively. Although the corresponding coefficients for the 
t>20 group are statistically insignificant, they remain positive and the coefficient for output growth – 
in column (4) – is quantitatively similar to the difference-in-difference coefficient for the 20 percent 
protect industries. All in all, the results in columns (4)-(6) indicate that although the t>20 industries 
may not have benefited from tariff protection as much as industries protected at the 20 percent level, 
they did derive some economic benefit from the policy for output and productivity growth. 
 
B.7 Three-Group Classification and Outliers 
Figures 3 and 4 indicate that there may be outliers in our dataset that could have implications for 
the robustness of our results. In this section we account for this, by running regressions with outlying 
observations removed from the sample. Because we run regressions with three different dependent 
variables of interest, we are careful to ensure that we remove the same industries from the sample for 
each regression. That is, to qualify as an outlier, the industry must be an outlier in terms of output, 
productivity and employment growth. Consequently, this means we do not adopt a formal statistical 
procedure to select outliers. Instead, we rely on scatterplots for all three dependent variables to inform 
our choice. Based on visual inspection of all scatterplots, only one industry appears to qualify as an 
outlier for output, productivity and employment growth: sugar and glucose. For this reason, we estimate 
our baseline three-group regression with this industry removed. The results are presented in table B12 
for the 1924-30 and 1930-35 periods. 
The results presented in Table B12 indicate that our headline results are robust to the removal of 
the sugar and glucose industry – a potential outlier – from our sample. In particular, the difference-in-
difference coefficient on additionally protected industries for output growth remains significant at the 
5 percent level, and the corresponding coefficient for productivity growth is significant at the 10 percent 
level. Nevertheless, the quantitative values of the difference-in-difference coefficients are smaller than 
those presented in table 2 (for the full sample).  
The disaggregated sectoral classification, informed by Barna (1952), is primarily included in the 
regression to capture time-varying, industry-specific influences, as well as potential non-random tariff 
assignment. However, because these control variables allow for a high level of disaggregation amongst 
sectors, they may additionally account for worries about outlying industries. Table B4 indicates that, in 
effect, a number of industries receive an industry-specific control variable. As Tables 2, B7 and B8 
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indicate, our headline results remain robust to the inclusion of these disaggregated sectoral control 
variables. 
 
Table B12: Difference-in-Difference Results for Three-Group Regression (1924-30 and 1930-35) 
with the Sugar and Glucose Industry Removed from the Sample 
 (1) 
Net Output 
Growth 
(2) 
Net Output 
per worker 
Growth 
(3) 
Employment 
Growth 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
3.604** 
(1.717) 
1.920* 
(1.127) 
1.642 
(1.150) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
1.457 
(2.778) 
-0.472 
(1.778) 
1.910 
(2.066) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
-2.478*** 
(0.926) 
-1.217 
(0.797) 
-1.217* 
(0.710) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, ?̂?𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
-0.970 
(1.879) 
0.090 
(1.257) 
-1.044 
(1.394) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 𝛼𝛼�1 0.879 
(1.567) 
0.765 
(0.899) 
0.099 
(1.006) 
Constant, 𝛼𝛼�0 3.629*** 
(0.812) 
2.556*** 
(0.635) 
1.048* 
(0.588) 
    
Observations 216 216 216 
R-squared 0.111 0.073 0.043 
Note: Estimated regression results for the three-group classification with Sugar and Glucose industry 
removed from sample. In column (1), the dependent variable is annualised average (real) net output 
growth. The corresponding dependent variables in columns (2) and (3) are annualised average net output 
per worker growth and employment growth respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS and 
robust standard errors are reported, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
B.8  Three-Group Classification and Weighted Regression 
 In this appendix, we document the robustness of our headline results to the weighting of 
industry growth rates by the size of each industry’s output. To implement this, we construct weights for 
industry growth rates using the ratio of net output (in constant prices) for each industry in 1924 relative 
to the mean level of net output (in constant prices) across industries in the same year25. This scheme 
therefore places a larger weight on industries that were large in size – measured in terms of their net 
output – and a smaller weight on industries that produced with smaller scale. 
 The regression results with weighted growth rates are presented in table B13. As in table 2, 
columns (2)-(5) report estimated regression coefficients with the additional control variables included 
in the regression. Panel A of table B13 illustrates that the estimated treatment effect of the tariff on 
weighted output growth lies between 3.84 and 5.02 percentage points per annum for the additionally 
protected industries. In all but one of the five regressions, the result is significant at the 5 percent level. 
The estimated treatment effect is significant at the 10 percent level when the Census of Production 
sectoral classification is used in the set of controls. 
                                                          
25 We also investigated the sensitivity of our results to weighting the growth rates using industry weights in 
1930. The results, for 1930-35 and 1930-48 using the three-group classification, are robust to the weighting of 
growth rates with the net output (in constant prices) of industries in 1930. 
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Table B13: Three-Group Difference-in-Difference Results with Weighted Growth Rates  
Panel A: Net Output Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
4.922** 
(2.184) 
4.707* 
(2.486) 
3.844** 
(1.772) 
4.436** 
(2.191) 
5.023** 
(2.223) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
2.048 
(2.235) 
0.899 
(3.593) 
3.073 
(2.225) 
1.565 
(2.372) 
1.830 
(2.418) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
-2.330** 
(0.929) 
-1.942** 
(0.911) 
-2.378** 
(0.912) 
-1.817** 
(0.856) 
-2.373** 
(0.931) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-2.157** 
(0.897) 
-2.592** 
(1.310) 
-3.388*** 
(0.961) 
-1.796* 
(1.009) 
-2.196** 
(0.940) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
-0.589 
(1.882) 
4.222 
(2.982) 
-1.909 
(1.513) 
-1.429 
(2.737) 
-0.458 
(2.493) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 3.215*** 
(0.718) 
-0.303 
(1.279) 
1.810** 
(0.870) 
3.816*** 
(1.123) 
3.380*** 
(0.902) 
      
Control Variables Included None Census of 
Production 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.064 0.154 0.682 0.083 0.071 
Panel B: Net Output per worker Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
2.419* 
(1.449) 
2.438 
(1.486) 
2.537* 
(1.501) 
2.214 
(1.463) 
2.425* 
(1.430) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-0.250 
(1.330) 
-1.990 
(2.051) 
1.490 
(1.587) 
-0.430 
(1.518) 
-0.564 
(1.393) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
-0.833 
(0.575) 
-0.830 
(0.626) 
-1.124 
(0.873) 
-0.674 
(0.558) 
-0.785 
(0.574) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-0.876 
(0.612) 
-1.401* 
(0.720) 
-1.244 
(0.884) 
-0.861 
(0.681) 
-0.792 
(0.618) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
0.627 
(1.098) 
3.678* 
(2.223) 
-0.864 
(1.284) 
0.278 
(2.080) 
1.137 
(1.359) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 1.922*** 
(0.433) 
1.555 
(0.974) 
0.716 
(0.673) 
2.328** 
(0.898) 
1.671*** 
(0.531) 
      
Control Variables Included None Census of 
Production 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.064 0.215 0.554 0.092 0.076 
Panel C: Employment Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D-in-D for >10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
2.477* 
(1.484) 
2.236 
(1.647) 
1.253 
(1.295) 
2.191 
(1.466) 
2.573* 
(1.543) 
D-in-D for 10% Protected 
Industries, 𝜹𝜹�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
2.285 
(1.472) 
2.905 
(2.383) 
1.515 
(1.503) 
1.981 
(1.546) 
2.385 
(1.649) 
Dummy Variable for >10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 
-1.452* 
(0.811) 
-1.065 
(0.798) 
-1.198 
(1.013) 
-1.102 
(0.757) 
-1.542* 
(0.819) 
Dummy Variable for 10% 
Protected Industries, 𝜷𝜷�𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 
-1.254* 
(0.719) 
-1.168 
(1.119) 
-2.072** 
(1.018) 
-0.915 
(0.848) 
-1.373* 
(0.768) 
Dummy Variable for 1930-35, 
𝜶𝜶�𝟏𝟏 
-1.239 
(1.280) 
0.516 
(2.014) 
-1.001 
(1.007) 
-1.719 
(1.808) 
-1.627 
(1.835) 
Constant, 𝜶𝜶�𝟎𝟎 1.271** 
(0.571) 
-1.842 
(1.474) 
1.054 
(0.814) 
1.466 
(0.947) 
1.678** 
(0.828) 
      
Control Variables Included None Census of 
Production 
Sectors 
Disagg. 
(Barna) Sectors 
KS Dummies Elect. 
Dummies 
      
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 
R-squared 0.019 0.113 0.651 0.039 0.024 
Notes: Estimated regression results for the three-group classification with growth rates weighted by the 1924 net output (in 
constant prices) relative to the mean across industries in the same year. In panel A, the dependent variable is annualised average 
(real) net output weighted growth. The corresponding dependent variables in panels B and C are annualised average net output 
per worker weighted growth and employment weighted growth, respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust 
standard errors are reported, where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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In panel B of table B12, the estimated treatment effect on the weighted productivity growth of 
additionally protected industries is between 2.21 and 2.54 percentage points per annum. This figure is 
significant at the 10 percent level in three of the five regressions, including the baseline regression, as 
well as the regression with the disaggregated Barna (1952) sectoral classification used in the set of 
control variables. 
 
 
